平成２８年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程前期２年の課程入学試験

（　秋期・一般選抜　）問題

専門科目Ⅰ　英　語　学

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。

受験番号	

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［Ⅰ］次の英文を読んで設問に答えなさい。

Linguistics is an old subject, and since 1957 it has been a great one. In that year *Syntactic Structures* was published, initiating officially what we would now call "Chomskyan linguistics." The enormous and successive stimuli to the discipline due to Chomsky's work over the past fifty years have significantly changed the landscape of linguistics, and its vast influence is palpable in the mainstream of linguistic thinking and research. The most recent book-length manifestation of these developments is *The Minimalist Program*.

The Minimalist Program (henceforth, MP) can be characterized from a number of perspectives which give it an interesting, and potentially far-reaching, interdisciplinary character. It can be considered simply as a linguistic framework involving a substantial revision of many of the technical assumptions and theoretical proposals which have been developed within the Chomskyan paradigm prior to the early 1990s. It can also be viewed as an extension and reconstruction of the biolinguistic approach to language which was initiated by Chomsky (1955, 1965) and Lenneberg (1967), an approach which views language as a biological capacity rooted in evolution. Moreover, from ontological and methodological perspectives, the MP embraces a "naturalistic" approach to language as a "mental organ" of the brain, an approach based on the assumption that the mind is part of the natural world and, as such, it should be studied in the same way as any other aspect of nature.

(A)These perspectives are closely related in that the substantial revision of preminimalist assumptions and theories is committed to the goal of achieving a principled explanation of linguistic phenomena, an explanation that is intended to go beyond the sphere of influence of genetic endowment to general principles which relate not just to language, but to general cognition or to the natural world as a whole. The standard for this explanation is set by the central thesis of the MP, the so-called Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT), which suggests that language is "well designed" to satisfy certain legibility conditions for its interaction with other cognitive systems.

In fact, proponents of the minimalist program believe that there is even more to the SMT than just setting a standard for true explanation in linguistics. It has been argued, for instance, that if this thesis is on the right track, one should expect a number of positive consequences, not just for linguistics, but for science in general. Two of these stand out. (B)One concerns the study of the evolution of language, and the other relates to the prospects of unification in science. As to the former, Chomsky (2007b: 2-3) argues that "the less attributed to genetic information ... for determining the development of an organism, the more feasible the study of its evolution." Similarly, though in a somewhat different context, Hauser *et al.* (2002) and Fitch *et al.* (2005) suggest that if most of the properties of language can be found in species other than humans, then a comparative empirical approach to the evolution of language becomes more feasible. In regard to the prospects of unification in science, some minimalists believe that if language turns out to indeed be "well-designed" or "optimal" in the sense of the SMT, that is, if aspects of the general principles that determine the "design" of language can be regarded as direct consequences of the workings of the laws of physics, then this outcome should be celebrated as a step towards this goal.

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Thus, if the SMT turns out to be correct, it will have implications not only for the conduct of linguistic analysis itself, but also for our understanding of the place of language in the world. In fact, and as I hope to show in this book, different, but no less significant, implications will follow if the SMT turns out to be false in specific respects; (C)minimalism promises to yield significant implications whether its central claim turns out to be true or false, and this, I take it, is the definition of a good research program. From such perspectives, it is hard to see how any linguist can fail to be interested in it.

The core questions that this interest raises, and that this book seeks to answer, are the following: (1) what is the nature of the transition to Minimalism? (2) How should the SMT be interpreted? (3) How plausible is the SMT from an evolutionary perspective? (4) To what extent does the SMT provide an appropriate standard for true explanation of linguistic phenomena? (5) Are there, as some minimalists would have us believe, genuine connections between the principles of language and the laws of physics? (6) Is the "bio" in "biolinguistics" really significant or does it merely reflect an implicit belief that the scientific merit of linguistics is proportional to the strength of its relation with the more advanced sciences?

In attempting to answer question (1), I have found it necessary to first take a broad view of the general development of Chomskyan linguistics, with the primary aim of clarifying some of the misconceptions that have been expressed by (ironically enough) some well-known popularisers of Chomsky's work. (D)For only when these misconceptions are dispelled will we be in a better position to understand the nature of the shift to minimalism. This shift, as I argue in this book, is neither a matter of taking account of methodological considerations, as some advocates of the MP seem to believe, nor is it as dramatic and unexpected as some critics have suggested. By examining the defining features of the pre-minimalistic conception of language, and by identifying their fate in the context of the MP, I seek to demonstrate that the shift to minimalism is merely one of emphasis among the factors that govern the nature of the language faculty.

The answer to question (2) calls for an exploration of the nature and content of the SMT, and this is one of the two main tasks that this book undertakes. I argue that Chomsky's work over the past fifteen years suggests three different formulations of the SMT, some of which seem to be incompatible with his own views on language. (E)I also show that by making clear the differences between the three formulations of the SMT, and by submitting the phrase "virtual conceptual necessity" to critical analysis and examination, it is possible to avoid much of the confusion surrounding its interpretation. Each of the three formulations of the SMT will be discussed in turn, and after pointing out the shortcomings of the first two, I argue that the last formulation provides the most transparent reflection of the content of the thesis. This content involves (F)two distinct claims and the evaluation of each of these constitutes the other main task of the book.

The first claim is an ontological one. It asserts that universal grammar contains nothing beyond the combinatorial operation Merge; i.e. the genetic component of the language faculty is confined to this recursive operation. This is what I will call the merge-only hypothesis, and to evaluate it is to evaluate the SMT from an evolutionary perspective and thereby provide an answer to question (3). Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to contrast Chomsky's work with his contributions to Hauser *et al.* (2002) and Fitch *et al.* (2005). For it is my contention that a careful analysis of the similarities and differences between Chomsky's linguistic and interdisciplinary discourses should caution us against an assumption that is widespread in the literature, namely that the notion of "recursion" as employed by Hauser *et al.* (2002) is identical to "merge" in the minimalist vocabulary. Through such an analysis I develop a conceptual and empirical assessment of the merge-only hypothesis, and I clarify its relation to the recursion-only hypothesis of Hauser *et al.*, concluding that the two hypotheses are not equivalent and have different empirical content. I also argue that not only are there conceptual and empirical difficulties surrounding the merge-only hypothesis, but that there is also an uncomfortable ambiguity in Chomsky's position regarding the ontological status of merge, an ambiguity that is not easy to resolve.

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The second claim which the SMT involves is epistemological. As mentioned above, this minimalist thesis is intended to set a standard for true explanation of linguistic phenomena, and through its (implicit) connection to the notion of "physical law" it promises a better understanding of the place of language in the world. This brings to the fore questions (4) and (5): does the SMT offer a principled explanation of linguistic phenomena? Are there non-trivial connections between the principles of language and the laws of physics? As will be seen through this book, my own answer to both questions is negative, and while I suggest a way to ameliorate certain aspects of minimalist explanation, I make it clear that some of the attempts which have been made to ground optimal computation in physical law do more harm to the MP than good. I also consider the explanatory status of the kind of physics which some minimalists take to be germane to the MP, and I demonstrate that it is no longer acceptable in modern physics.

Of course, it is one thing to say that there is little empirical support for the deduction of optimal computation from physical "neatness" and another to say that such a deduction is untenable in principle. Indeed, (G)an attitude of "let's wait and see" is sometimes expressed by advocates of the biolinguistic approach to language in defence of their speculations on the connections between linguistics and physics. In fact, Chomsky himself expresses this same attitude in his criticism of Fodorian functionalism*, the philosophical doctrine that asserts, among other things, that the level of abstraction at which our explanatory theories of the mental are made is principled. He suggests that this level of abstraction should be conceived of as a "temporary convenience" which may not resist further examination at a more fundamental level, say that of neurology. Clearly, this optimism on the prospects of unifying cognitive science with brain science underlies Chomsky's biolinguistics and its quest for a principled explanation in linguistics. But is this unification really necessary for linguistic theory or does it merely reflect Chomsky's (2000a: 77) belief that "the place to look for answers is where they are likely to be found: in the hard sciences"? This is another way of expressing the remaining question on the list above: is the "bio" in "biolinguistics" really significant or does it merely reflect an implicit belief that the scientific merit of linguistics is proportional to the strength of its relation with the more advanced sciences? As a necessary step on the way towards an answer to this question, I assess the explanatory status of optimal computation in the context of the philosophy of mind. By bringing Chomsky's naturalism face-to-face with Fodorian functionalism I seek to pin down some tensions that arise between the two. (H)I argue that some of these have significant implications for the explanatory role of optimal computation in particular, and for the status of the biolinguistic approach to language in general, leading to a revised version of minimalism in which optimal computation plays its familiar role but is now regarded as primitive rather than triggering a search for a deeper level of explanation.

[From Fahad Rashed Al-Mutari, *The Minimalist Program: The Nature and Plausibility of Chomsky's Biolinguistics*, Cambridge University Press.]

Fodorian functionalism* ジェリー・フォーダー（アメリカの哲学者）が唱えた機能主義と呼ばれる仮説

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問1　下線部（A）について、具体的内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問2　下線部（B）について、具体的内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問3　下線部（C）を日本語に訳しなさい。

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問4　下線部（D）を日本語に訳しなさい。

問5　下線部（E）を日本語に訳しなさい。

問6　下線部（F）について、具体的内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

受験番号	

問7　下線部（G）について、具体的内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問8　下線部（H）を日本語に訳しなさい。

受験番号	

[II] 以下の日本語の文を英語に訳しなさい。

「なぜ?」と疑問をもち、知識を総動員して、自分で答えを見つけ出す。論理的な思考とは、そのプロセスの中で自ずと出来上がっていくものです。ただし、自分の頭の中に留めておくだけではいけません。論理的な思考とは、人に向かって説明をし、人と一緒に共有できて初めて完成するものなのです。

【坪田耕三『算数的思考法』(岩波新書) より】