平成29年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程前期2年の課程入学試験

（秋期・一般選抜）問題

外国語 英語A

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。
I. The following text should be read in the language of the document.

There are two surprises in store for anyone who delves into the concepts of optimism and pessimism. One is that the words themselves are of very recent origin; they were given currency in eighteenth-century France. The second surprise is that the words come from the writings of the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, author of the idea that we live in the best of all possible worlds—an idea made famous not by Leibniz himself but by Voltaire’s satirical attack on it in his novella *Candide*.

Leibniz argued that since God is entirely good, this world must be the best possible world there can be—even with all its imperfections of disease, tsunamis, war and evil. For, he said, all of these things must have been foreseen and planned by God, for whom a perfect world—one in which such things do not exist—would not be the best world, presumably because it would not give the right opportunities to his human creatures to have faith, endurance, helpfulness and the other virtues necessary for admission to heaven. Here he was trying to solve what philosophers call ‘the problem of evil’, summed up in the question: how can the perfect goodness of a deity be consistent with such horrors as, say, childhood cancer?

Leibniz’s clever answer has persuaded few; no ordinary father would subject his children to the sufferings and terrors that this world is capable of imposing, even for a few seconds, with the aim (the optimistic aim?) of making them ‘better’ in some way. But in the process he gave us the words ‘optimist’ and ‘optimism’, derived from his use of the Latin *optimum*, ‘best’, and his claim that this world is optimal even though imperfect. From ‘optimist’ it is easy to coin ‘pessimist’: and that is what the French did, under Voltaire’s influence.

But though the words are new, the attitudes are of course as old as humanity, for there were undoubtedly optimists and pessimists among our cave-dwelling ancestors. And that raises an interesting question: which of those attitudes most prevailed among our cave-dwelling ancestors? One cliché (and clichés tend to be true) says that pessimists are realists. Is that how they survived among the sabre-toothed tigers and woolly mammoths? But another cliché says that optimism is essential to achievement and progress, because, as the psychologist William James pointed out, pessimism leads to weakness whereas optimism gives power. Were our cave-dwelling ancestors mainly optimists therefore? This dilemma is reflected in the rich tradition of opinions, jokes and philosophical reflections relating to optimism and its opposite. Bar-room opinion tends to the view that pessimism is the right attitude to take, because experience teaches that if things can go wrong they will, that human life is full of disappointments and anyway leads only to age, illness and death, that the individual is confronted by such massive forces of nature and society that it is ludicrous to suppose he can prevail against them—and so on. This is described as realism, and Mark Twain said that if anyone was still an optimist after the age of fifty, there must be something wrong with his head.

But although it is only rational to be realistic, it is arguably rational—and not inconsistent—to be optimistic at the same time. The Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci put it neatly by saying, ‘I am a realist because of intelligence, an optimist because of will’. A realist sees the difficulties ahead, the optimist looks for the opportunities they offer. If one were defeated by the prospect of difficulties, one would assuredly be a pessimist; the belief that difficulties in their own way present opportunities is the characteristic optimist’s response. For the optimist, problems and hitches teach valuable lessons, and offer stepping stones to rise higher or detours to a better road.

From the philosophical point of view there are two good responses to pessimism. If one views pessimism as the habitual expectation that things will go wrong, that effort will more likely fail than succeed, and that therefore there is never much use in trying, one sees it as nihilism, a negative and defeated view of life which makes living less valuable than not living. This is what Albert Camus had in mind when he said that the great philosophical question is whether or not one should commit suicide; for if one’s answer is ‘no’, this will be because one believes that there is something worth living for—which means: something worth doing and being—which is the optimist’s view. So by implication, the true pessimist has no reason to live.

The second response is to see pessimism not as nihilism but, as it typically indeed claims to be, genuine realism, and to accept the resigned attitude of stoicism that this implies. Stoicism is the noble philosophy of classical antiquity which said that we must achieve self-mastery over things we can control, namely our appetites and fears, and that we must face the things we
cannot control—the vicissitudes of life—with courage and endurance; because by doing so, said the Stoics, we will have made life not merely bearable but worthwhile, despite everything.

Those who are sceptical about optimism see it as idealistic, naïve, bound for a fall, and therefore more than somewhat ludicrous. And yet (when one considers the characteristic optimist’s response as described above—the one that finds opportunity in difficulty—one sees that it explains why most achievements, most progress, most new companies, most buildings, most great careers, all began with optimism, that ‘journey to somewhere that started from nowhere with little or nothing’. For even if it were true that most lives and their ambitions end in failure, that would not be a reason for not trying. It would be a reason for being more thoughtful and careful, better prepared, equipped with plans B and C, fortified by courage, determined to hold one’s nerve, to keep trying, to learn from mistakes and defeats: all of which is the very stuff of life itself, and is what makes life worth living. Which is in short to say: that what makes life worth living is optimism.

We have seen that starting in the seventh century Greek communities such as Sparta and Athens experienced a significant amount of democratization and that starting in the sixth century major changes took place in Greek sport, as men from non-elite families began to participate in large numbers. These developments were clearly linked; as men from families of *penetes* gained sociopolitical privileges, they found themselves in a position to be able to participate in sport. In that sense, democratization in society resulted in democratization in sport, because sociopolitical change opened up an activity that had previously been largely the preserve of a small number of elites. However, sport also had an important effect on society, because, by promoting a sense of egalitarianism and unity among the empowered members of newly democratized communities, it did much to foster democratization in society. There were four separate mechanisms involved, each of which will be examined in turn.

Sport participation helped promote the creation of the requisite egalitarian relationships between *plousioi* and *penetes*, and hence helped promote democratization, by serving as a model of and for such relationships. In order to understand how sport modeled egalitarian relationships, it is helpful to think of sport as a ritualized activity. Use of the term `ritualized activity' typically carries the explicit or implicit assumption that almost any activity can potentially take on the qualities of a ritual to a greater or lesser extent. An extraordinarily wide range of activities has been characterized as ritualized, and numerous attempts have been made to find commonalities shared by all ritualized activities. Perhaps the most productive approach to establishing suitable parameters for separating ritualized from non-ritualized activities is that outlined by Catherine Bell. She argues that ritualized activities must have an element of performance (i.e., they must involve participants doing something or acting something out) and are distinguished from other activities not so much by their content as by being contrasted with more mundane actions and by being framed as different and special ways of acting.

It requires no great intuitive leap to see that sport can easily become a ritualized activity. Sport is inherently performative and is framed as being set apart and different. Johan Huizinga, in his famous *Homo Ludens*, characterized sport as a form of play and defined play as a “free activity standing quite consciously outside ordinary life”. If other considerations, such as the provision of special playing fields and uniforms (or, in this case, nudity), are taken into account, the identification of sport as at least a potentially ritualized activity becomes almost an inevitability. The ritualized dimension of sport is reflected in the regularity with which it is compared to religion. Ritualized activities are “flexible forms of symbolic activity that reaffirm cultural values and a sense of order”. As such, they can serve as models of and for certain kinds of social relationships. As models of society, ritualized activities have the capacity to present idealized and simplified visions of how society and relations between individuals could or should be. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz famously described cockfights staged by the inhabitants of Bali as “a story they tell themselves about themselves.” The fact that ritualized activities are by definition set apart from everyday life is particularly significant, as they are for this reason immune to many of the mundane necessities of existence that otherwise can generate a divergence between the normative and normal. As a result, ritualized activities frequently, perhaps typically, reflect social norms with a degree of faithfulness that is otherwise difficult to achieve.

Greek sport can be understood as presenting a paradigm of *plousioi* and *penetes* interacting as equals. Sport was an activity set apart from everyday life and offered a figurative level playing field that strongly muted status differences based on factors such as lineage and wealth that were prominent in other contexts. To the extent that there were status differences among participants, they were largely the product of demonstrated competence at sport. Moreover, the mere willingness of two men to compete against each other in sport was an implicit statement of their relative equality. Sport thus provided a particularly clear model of what egalitarian relationships between *plousioi* and *penetes* might look like.

The impact of the egalitarian relationships embodied in sport was greatly amplified by the fact that they also served as a model for behavior in other social contexts. The power of ritualized activities to shape behavior is greatly enhanced through performance. The participants in ritualized activities do not simply hear about societal norms, they themselves enact those norms. As Geertz put it, “In a ritual, the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turn out to be the same world.” Performance constitutes an essential bridge between ritual activities serving as models of social norms and as models for actual behavior because participants reproduce idealized forms of behavior they are expected to manifest in some form in their daily lives.

The behavior enacted in ritualized activities teaches habits and dispositions that shape the actions of individuals in all settings and thus serves as a model for activity outside the ritualized sphere. Bell has argued that regular participation in ritualized activities physically inculcates the thought and behavioral patterns underpinning such activities and that "as bodies..."
吸収する空間と時間のロジックを理解し、それらを構成する構造的スキームとして投影し、自己の“感覚”に基づいて物の適切性を再現します。

—Paul Christesen, "Sport and Democratization in Ancient Greece" (2014)

*penetes = 貧しい人々、庶民 **egalitarianism = 平等主義 ↑ploutoi = 豪華な人々

問1 下線部 (A) について、その内容を本文に即して具体的に説明しなさい。

問2 下線部 (B) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問3 下線部 (C) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問4 下線部 (D) 'in other contexts' を、本文中の別の語句を用いて言い換えなさい。

問5 下線部 (E) を日本語に訳しなさい。
Instead of answering Question I, only foreign students can choose to write an introductory essay in English on your research plan. Your essay should be more than 200 words in length.