平成29年度
大学院文学研究科博士課程前期2年の課程入学試験

（春期・一般選抜）問題

専門科目Ⅰ 英語学

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。
Semantics is the branch of linguistics devoted to the investigation of linguistic meaning, the interpretation of expressions in a language system. We do not attempt a comprehensive survey of the many different approaches to semantics in recent linguistics but choose instead to introduce a particular framework in some detail. Many of the concepts and analytical techniques we introduce have their origins in logic and the philosophy of language; we apply them to the study of actual human languages.

When we say that our focus is on semantics as a branch of linguistics, we are adopting a particular conception of the methods and goals of linguistic inquiry. That conception is rooted in the generative paradigm that began to reshape the field of linguistics in fundamental ways over forty years ago. Noam Chomsky’s *Syntactic Structures*, published in 1957, introduced (1) the three key ideas that we take to be definitive of that paradigm.

The first is the idea that a grammar of a language can be viewed as a set of abstract devices, rule systems, and principles that serve to characterize formally various properties of the well-formed sentences of that language. The grammar, in this sense, generates the language. This idea was already established in the study of various artificial languages within logic and the infant field of computer science; what was novel was Chomsky’s claim that natural languages—the kind we all learn to speak and understand in early childhood—could also be generated by such formal systems. In a sense, when linguists adopted this view, they adopted the idea that theoretical linguistics is a branch of (applied) mathematics and in this respect like contemporary theoretical physics and chemistry.

Few generative linguists, however, would be completely comfortable with such a characterization of their discipline. A major reason for their finding it inadequate lies in the second key idea Chomsky introduced, namely, that generative grammars are psychologically real in the sense that they constitute accurate models of the (implicit) knowledge that underlies the actual production and interpretation of utterances by native speakers. Chomsky himself has never spoken of linguistics as part of mathematics but has frequently described it as a branch of cognitive psychology. It is the application of mathematical models to the study of the cognitive phenomenon of linguistic knowledge that most generative linguists recognize as their aim. Again, the parallel with a science like physics is clear. (2) To the extent that their interest is in mathematical systems as models of physical phenomena rather than in the formal properties of the systems for their own sake, physicists are not mathematicians. A single individual may, of course, be both a mathematician and a linguist (or a physicist). But as linguists, our focus is on modeling the cognitive systems whose operation in some sense “explains” linguistic phenomena. Linguistics is an empirical science, and in that respect it is like physics and unlike (pure) mathematics.
The third idea we want to draw from the generative paradigm is intimately connected to the first two: linguistics cannot be limited to the documentation of what is said and how it is interpreted—our actual performance as speakers and hearers—any more than physics can limit its subject matter to the documentation of measurements and meter readings of directly observable physical phenomena. The linguistic knowledge we seek to model, speakers’ competence, must be distinguished from their observable linguistic behavior. Both the linguist and the physicist posit abstract theoretical entities that help explain the observed phenomena and predict further observations under specified conditions.

The distinction between competence and performance has sometimes been abused and often misunderstood. We want to emphasize that we are not drawing it in order to claim that linguists should ignore performance, that observations of how people use language are irrelevant to linguistic theory. On the contrary, the distinction is important precisely because observations of naturally occurring linguistic behavior are critical kinds of data against which generative linguists test their theories. They are not, however, the only kinds of data available. For example, linguists often ask native speakers (sometimes themselves) for intuitive judgments as to whether certain strings of words in a given language constitute a well-formed or grammatical sentence of that language. (3) Such judgments are also data, but they seldom come “naturally.”

Our approach to semantics lies in the generative tradition in the sense that it adopts the three key ideas sketched above. This tradition started, as we have noted, with important advances in the study of syntax; fairly soon thereafter it bore fruit in phonology. There was important semantic work done by generative grammarians from the early sixties on, but it was not until the end of the sixties that systematic ways of linking the semantic methods developed by logicians to the generative enterprise were found. In our view, this development constitutes a breakthrough of enormous significance, one whose consequences linguists will be exploring for some time.

We begin by considering some of the linguistic phenomena that one might ask a semantic theory to account for, the range of data that seem at first glance centrally to involve meaning. Our first observation may discourage some readers: there is not total agreement on exactly which facts comprise that range. But this is hardly surprising. Recent discussions of epistemology and the philosophy of science repeatedly claim that there are no “raw” or “pure” data, that abstract principles come into play even in preliminary individuation of a given constellation of facts. (4) Thus, identifying phenomena is itself inescapably theory-laden. We will try, however, to introduce data here that are bound to our particular theoretical hypotheses only weakly. That is, accounting for (most of) these data seems a goal shared by many different approaches to semantics.

A second point to remember is that phenomena that pretheoretically involve meaning may prove not to be homogeneous. This too is unsurprising. Linguists have long recognized the heterogeneity of linguistic phenomena and so have divided the study of linguistic forms minimally into phonology and syntax and have further articulated each of these fields. (5) And, of course, it is recognized that syntax and phonology themselves interact with other cognitive systems and processes in explaining, for example, how people arrange and pronounce words in producing utterances. Similarly, the study of meaning is bound to be parcelled out to a variety of disciplines and perhaps also to different branches of linguistics.

[From Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction to Semantics (Second Version), The MIT Press]
問1 下線部（1）について、具体的内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問2 下線部（2）を日本語に訳しなさい。

問3 下線部（3）について、具体的内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。
問4 下線部（4）について、具体的内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。


問5 下線部（5）を日本語に訳しなさい。
例文（1）から（4）に関する以下の3つの問について答えなさい。
なお、例文中の斜体字は強調が置かれている部分を示す。

(1) John’s mother has kept the letter in the drawer.
(2) John’s mother has only kept the letter in the drawer.
(3) *John’s mother only keeps her letters in the drawer.
(4) John’s mother has kept only the letter in the drawer.

問1 文（1）は多義的であるが、それぞれの意味を日本語で示しなさい。
また、それぞれの意味を表す構文構造を樹形図で示しなさい。
問2 文(2)と(3)の違いについて、onlyの作用域の観点から説明しなさい。

問3 文(1)と(4)の違いについて、onlyの作用域の観点から説明しなさい。
【III】以下の日本語の文を英語に訳しなさい。

よく話すのは、「どんな研究をしているの？」と尋ねられたときの、「大学の学部生」「大学院生」「教授」の回答の違いです。学部生はシンプルに答えるのですが、研究がまだ浅いので大切なところが抜けてしまいます。大学院生の場合は研究内容をくまなく説明しつつ、大事なところも押えていますが重要でないところも説明するので、メリハリがなくてわかりにくい。その点、ベテラン教授は何か重要な点で、何か枝葉をきちんとわかっているので、ポイントを押ええたうえで簡潔な説明ができる。

【池上彰・佐藤優『僕らが毎日やっている最強の読み方』（東洋経済新報社）より】