平成30年度
大学院文学研究科博士課程前期2年の課程入学試験
（秋期・一般選抜）問題

外国語  英語 A

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。
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問題【I】と問題【II】について日本語で解答しないでください。ただし、外国人受験者にかぎり問題【II】の代わりに問題【III】を選択できます。

【I】次の英文を読んで設問に答えなさい。

(1) It is hardly surprising that speakers of less prestigious nonstandard varieties come to feel the power of social convention, attitude, and prejudice—and more than that, come to believe that it must in fact rest upon what is right and proper. Sociolinguists have thus described a "minority-group reaction" in which the codes, postures, and practices of the dominant become accepted and normative among the less dominant, even where they may coexist with class or group resentment. The linguist Michael Halliday wrote that "a speaker who is made ashamed of his own language habits suffers a basic injury as a human being," an assessment that is surely more poignant because the injury does not, as many continue to think, occur because of any substantive deficiencies.

Given the sturdiness of social prejudice and stereotype, the continued existence of low-status speech varieties might at first seem odd. If they are generally considered inferior, wouldn’t more speakers try to eradicate them? And wouldn’t shifting away from a language or, more likely, a dialect be a more popular option? There is ample evidence that such shifting is not an attainable goal, and the ubiquity of the broadcast media today means that virtually everybody has at least a passive awareness of nonmaternal varieties. Indeed, some people do change, either completely replacing one variety with another, or expanding their linguistic repertoire to accommodate the requirements of different social contexts, thus becoming bilingual or bidialectal. (2) So adaptations are possible.

(3) These transitions are not without problems, however, and two come immediately to mind. First, it is no light matter to attempt alterations that will set you apart from members of your group: some severing of important ties may occur; you may be seen as a sort of pariah, resented or ostracized. Second, you must also hope that transitions come off successfully: falling between linguistic or cultural stools means risking social marginalization. Even relative success is tricky, particularly if you want to go home again. Mexican Americans who have "migrated" to English have been labeled vendedores, "sell-outs"; the same epithet has been applied to French Canadians, too: vendus. So, there are practical difficulties here, and this is even assuming that no other group markers (skin color, for instance) exist to hamper mobility.

The group-solidarity function of any variety can be compelling. A language variety of low social status may be a hindrance—a particularly unfair hindrance—but it is the variety of one’s immediate group. The language of home and hearth, of first expression, of intimacy, is not abandoned or altered on a whim. All varieties are capable of reflecting and sustaining bonds of the greatest significance, and language is clearly a potent support of personal group identity. It is true that identity can survive language shift, but it seems obvious that the expansion of linguistic repertoires, especially at the level of dialect, is an altogether more satisfactory adaptation than outright replacement. The implication is that, powerful social attitudes notwithstanding, language varieties of low prestige are unlikely to disappear. (And a good thing, too: they add their own particular flavor and value to the larger linguistic picture. (4) All languages would be the poorer without the breadth of nuance found across the entire spectrum of class and regional variation.)
Studies of the perception of language varieties have taken into account many more variables than those described here. Over the last half-century, the use of a wide range of attitudinal (or belief) measures has produced a sizable literature. It is possible to predict with some confidence how people will react when they hear all sorts of dialect varieties, to understand why nonstandard speech can seem attractive to some middle-class speakers, to accept bilingual and bidialectal accommodations as entirely reasonable, and to assess reactions to the language of nonnative speakers. (5) At a general level then, evaluative responses can be predicted quite well, as can the triggering of attitudes—often stereotypical ones—by variations in language and speech. The relationship between language and identity is not a mystery.

—from John Edwards, Sociolinguistics

問1 下線部(1)を日本語に訳しなさい。

問2 著者が下線部(2)のような主張をする根拠は何か。本文に即して説明しなさい。
問3 下線部(3)は具体的にどのようなことか。本文に即して説明しなさい。

問4 下線部(4)を日本語に訳しなさい。

問5 下線部(5)を日本語に訳しなさい。
Life would be difficult without the ability reliably to store and to recall lots of commonplace facts, the names of our friends and acquaintances, telephone numbers, our way home after school or work, etc. These are explicit or semantic memories and they constitute our declarative knowledge. We know that neurons are nerve cells, that Edinburgh is the capital city of Scotland, that water will turn to ice at zero degrees, and that you must first boil water to make a cup of tea. Declarative knowledge is essential to the understanding of how things work and thus to an understanding of the world we live in. It is a body of knowledge that helps us to regulate our behaviour according to and dependent on reliable factual memories. Navigational skills, for example, depend on our ability to deploy a complex store of declarative knowledge, including detailed spatial memories and representations of the world. (1) We assume all of the facts that constitute our knowledge of things must be stored in an organized fashion to be useful. Though this has not been demonstrated, it seems likely that the brain stores our semantic memories as modules that have some logical links to one another; they are grouped by category for instance. When we are trying to recall some fact, for instance the name of an acquaintance, our brain knows where to find the memory because it belongs to a particular category that is stored in a particular location or has a particular address in the brain.

Our brain’s memory banks, however, do much more for us than store lots of useful facts. One important non-factual category of memory is procedural knowledge. This is the consequence of learning how to do something difficult such as riding a bicycle, knitting, or tying one’s shoelaces. These are certainly difficult skills to acquire, but once learnt they are never forgotten, even without occasional practice. Thus it seems that the knowledge or information required for the execution of very complex motor routines or procedures is somehow laid down in a robust permanent memory store. The parts of the brain involved in the acquisition of complex motor skills are the basal ganglia and the cerebellum. Motor skills are an essential part of our memory store, but it is difficult to describe the ‘know-how’ in words. (2) In this sense the memory is said to be implicit; you cannot explain how to ride a bicycle, whereas you could explain quite effectively your explicit memory for how to make a cup of tea.

Episodic memory corresponds to our memories of past events or episodes. (3) Notice that our memory for episodes differs in important respects from our remembering of facts. First, we can acquire a memory for a fact gradually – learning a new telephone number for example may require several attempts. But a remembered episode, a childhood visit to the zoo, is a memory for a unique event that only happened once and there is no opportunity for learning the event by rehearsal. Secondly, a fact is a fact, our semantic memory for a new telephone number is therefore either true or false. The memory can easily be verified and two people’s true memory for the same number will of course be the same. Episodic memories are not so easily verified. My sister and I may have very different memories of that visit to the zoo. So episodic memories are personal, highly selective, idiosyncratic, and possibly false, but they may also be richly complex and movie-like in character. They constitute the stories we tell ourselves about our past, they are the things we would write about in our autobiography. Episodic memories can be recalled deliberately or are triggered by evocative sensory stimuli. A particularly powerful stimulus evocative of episodic memory is the sense of smell. Exactly why this should be so is unclear, as the sense of smell is not well developed in humans and it links with primitive brain centres in the hypothalamus.
(4) Because you can be surprised by an evoked memory of an episode you were not aware you had, there is uncertainty about exactly how much of our past is stored but not generally available to us. The evocation of vivid recollections that you were unaware had been memorized suggests that not everything is accessible by deliberate attempts at recall. Evidence for this was first provided in the 1940s by the American neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield (1891-1976). Penfield studied medicine at Oxford where in 1914 he was inspired by the influential British neurophysiologist Charles Sherrington (1852-1957), the scientist who coined the terms neuron and synapse and whose work on many aspects of the mammalian nervous system won him the Nobel Prize in 1932. In 1934 Penfield founded the Montreal Institute of Neurology and there performed many operations on conscious epileptic patients during which he electrically stimulated small regions of the cerebral cortex. In the course of the operations patients reported very detailed memories of long past events. When he stimulated the same small area again the same memory popped into the patient’s mind, memories about things or events that otherwise were not recalled.

(5) These experiments did show that episodic memories may not be readily recallable, but some have wrongly interpreted these experiments to mean that every past episode is stored. Most importantly, however, Penfield had found the first evidence for a physical basis of memory. The fact that the same memory was evoked by repeated stimulation in the same place suggested that specific memories not only have a physical basis but that each also has a particular physical location in the brain.

---from Michael O'Shea, The Brain

問1 下線部(1)を日本語に訳しなさい。

問2 下線部(2)の内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。
問3 下線部 (3) の内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。


問4 下線部 (4) を日本語に訳しなさい。


問5 下線部 (5) の内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。
Instead of answering Question II, only foreign students can choose to write an essay in English on “The Internet and an Academic Education.” Your essay should be more than 200 words in length.