平成３１年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程前期２年の課程入学試験

（ 秋期・社会人特別選抜 ）問題

筆記試験 社会学

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。
平成31年度
大学院文学研究科博士課程前期2年の課程入学試験

（秋期・社会人特別選抜）問題

筆記試験（社会学 専攻分野）

次の英文を読み、以下の問いに答えない。

[1] 下線部（1）を日本語に訳しなさい。

[2] 下線部（2）を日本語に訳しなさい。

[3] 下線部（3）を日本語に訳しなさい。

[4] 本文全体の内容を要約しなさい。

[5] 社会学がmodernityをどのようにとらえてきたかについて、複数の社会学理論家に言及し、
またその差異や論争点を明らかにする形で、説明しなさい。

[6] あなた自身はmodernityをどのようにとらえるか。あなた自身の考えを述べなさい。

(') Modernity is a post-traditional order, but not one in which the
sureties of tradition and habit have been replaced by the certitude
of rational knowledge. Doubt, a pervasive feature of modern
critical reason, permeates into everyday life as well as philosophi
cal consciousness, and forms a general existential dimension of
the contemporary social world. Modernity institutionalises the
principle of radical doubt and insists that all knowledge takes the
form of hypotheses: claims which may very well be true, but
which are in principle always open to revision and may have at
some point to be abandoned. Systems of accumulated expertise —
which form important disembedding influences — represent multi
ple sources of authority, frequently internally contested and
divergent in their implications. In the settings of what I call 'high'
or 'late' modernity — our present-day world — the self, like the
broader institutional contexts in which it exists, has to be re
flexively made. Yet this task has to be accomplished amid a
puzzling diversity of options and possibilities.

In circumstances of uncertainty and multiple choice, the
notions of trust and risk have particular application. Trust, I
argue, is a crucial generic phenomenon of personality develop
ment as well as having distinctive and specific relevance to a
world of disembedding mechanisms and abstract systems. In its
generic manifestations, trust is directly linked to achieving an
early sense of ontological security. Trust established between an
infant and its caretakers provides an 'inoculation' which screens
off potential threats and dangers that even the most mundane
activities of day-to-day life contain. Trust in this sense is basic to a
'protective cocoon' which stands guard over the self in its dealings
with everyday reality. It 'brackets out' potential occurrences
which, were the individual seriously to contemplate them, would produce a paralysis of the will, or feelings of engulfment. In its more specific guise, trust is a medium of interaction with the abstract systems which both empty day-to-day life of its traditional content and set up globalising influences. Trust here generates that 'leap into faith' which practical engagement demands.

(2) Modernity is a risk culture. I do not mean by this that social life is inherently more risky than it used to be; for most people in the developed societies that is not the case. Rather, the concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both lay actors and technical specialists organise the social world. Under conditions of modernity, the future is continually drawn into the present by means of the reflexive organisation of knowledge environments.

A territory, as it were, is carved out and colonised. Yet such colonisation by its very nature cannot be complete: thinking in terms of risk is vital to assessing how far projects are likely to diverge from their anticipated outcomes. Risk assessment invites precision, and even quantification, but by its nature is imperfect. Given the mobile character of modern institutions, coupled to the mutable and frequently controversial nature of abstract systems, most forms of risk assessment, in fact, contain numerous imponderables.

Modernity reduces the overall riskiness of certain areas and modes of life, yet at the same time introduces new risk parameters largely or completely unknown to previous eras. These parameters include high-consequence risks: risks deriving from the globalised character of the social systems of modernity. The late modern world— the world of what I term high modernity— is apocalyptic, not because it is inevitably heading towards calamity, but because it introduces risks which previous generations have not had to face. However much there is progress towards international negotiation and control of armaments, so long as nuclear weapons remain, or even the knowledge necessary to build them, and so long as science and technology continue to be involved with the creation of novel weaponry, the risk of massively destructive warfare will persist. Now that nature, as a phenomenon external to social life, has in a certain sense come to an 'end'— as a result of its domination by human beings— the risks of ecological catastrophe form an inevitable part of our horizon of day-to-day life. Other high-consequence risks, such as the collapse of global economic mechanisms, or the rise of totalitarian superstates, are an equally unavoidable part of our contemporary experience.

In high modernity, the influence of distant happenings on proximate events, and on intimacies of the self, becomes more and more commonplace. The media, printed and electronic, obviously play a central role in this respect. Mediated experience, since the first experience of writing, has long influenced both self-identity and the basic organisation of social relations. With the development of mass communication, particularly electronic communication, the interpenetration of self-development and social systems, up to and including global systems, becomes ever more pronounced. The 'world' in which we now live is in some
profound respects thus quite distinct from that inhabited by
human beings in previous periods of history. It is in many ways a
single world, having a unitary framework of experience (for
instance, in respect of basic axes of time and space), yet at the
same time one which creates new forms of fragmentation and
dispersal. A universe of social activity in which electronic media
have a central and constitutive role, nevertheless, is not one of
‘hyperreality’, in Baudrillard’s sense. Such an idea confuses the
pervasive impact of mediated experience with the internal
referentiality of the social systems of modernity – the fact that
these systems become largely autonomous and determined by
their own constitutive influences.

3) In the post-traditional order of modernity, and against the
backdrop of new forms of mediated experience, self-identity
becomes a reflexively organised endeavour. The reflexive project
of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet
continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the
context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems. In
modern social life, the notion of lifestyle takes on a particular
significance. The more tradition loses its hold, and the more daily
life is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the
local and the global, the more individuals are forced to negotiate
lifestyle choices among a diversity of options. Of course, there
are standardising influences too – most notably, in the form of
commodification, since capitalistic production and distribution
form core components of modernity’s institutions. Yet because of
the ‘openness’ of social life today, the pluralisation of contexts of
action and the diversity of ‘authorities’, lifestyle choice is increas-
ingly important in the constitution of self-identity and daily
activity. Reflexively organised life-planning, which normally
presumes consideration of risks as filtered through contact with
expert knowledge, becomes a central feature of the structuring of
self-identity.

出典：Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Polity
Press, 1991

【解答欄】