平成31年度
大学院文学研究科博士課程前期2年の課程入学試験
（春期・一般選抜）問題

専門科目Ⅰ 英語学 専攻分野

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。
(1) Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) made an important conceptual distinction between the Faculty of Language in the broad sense (FLB) and the Faculty of Language in the narrow sense (FLN). The former includes both the narrow-syntactic component that generates structural descriptions of sentences along with the two principal interfaces (Articulatory-Perceptual, governing the transduction of syntactic representations ultimately into a perceptual modality, speech or sign, and Conceptual-Intentional, converting syntactic representations into objects of thought, belief or judgement). It was suggested that aspects of FLB might not be specific to humans. FLN, on the other hand, was argued to consist purely of the computational system of the syntax, whose central property is discrete infinity: the ability to generate an infinite set of structural descriptions from the iterated application of the single structure-building operation Merge. Merge, as a property of finite human minds, must itself be finitely specifiable. Formulating Merge as a recursive function, able to apply to its own output in iterative fashion with no limit in principle, makes possible the generation of infinite sets from finite means. In slightly more formal terms, Merge can be seen as the intensional definition of a set of structural descriptions, whose extension is infinite. Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch thus argued that the central property of FLN was a recursive operation. They further suggested that FLN, and hence Merge, is a uniquely human trait, and one which is likely to have evolved very recently in human phylogeny, perhaps through exaptation from some other aspect of cognitive or motor function.

The obvious inference to make from Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch’s conclusions is that recursion is a property of all, and only, humans. Therefore, evidence of recursive structures of one kind or another should be available in all human languages; in fact, recursion, as part of FLN, forms part of the definition of a possible human language. This view was directly challenged by Everett (2005), who argued that Pirahã, an indigenous language isolate spoken in Amazonas, Brazil, lacks evidence for what is often seen as the clearest form of syntactic recursion, namely sentential embedding. If this conclusion is correct, then the view of FLN espoused by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch may be challenged. More generally, since Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch were articulating a particular version of the general programme of generative grammar as formulated originally by Chomsky (1955/1975, 1957), Everett’s conclusions may be seen as a challenge to the entire enterprise of generative grammar as it has been conceived since the 1950s; (2) this is certainly how Everett himself sees them.

The central question is then: what is the evidence from the indigenous languages of Brazil and elsewhere for and against recursive structures in natural language? On the simplest interpretation of what is at stake here, one could think that if such evidence is not directly forthcoming, then it is right to conclude, as Everett and others have, that the Chomskyan programme for linguistic theory is so fundamentally flawed that it must be abandoned. If, on the other hand, irrefutable evidence for such structures is available, then Everett’s challenge can be deemed to have failed, and Chomsky’s programme is thereby supported. Moreover, such a conclusion would in any case be naive. (3) One could argue, as Chomsky himself has done, that the absence of recursion in Pirahã proves nothing about the overall nature of the human language faculty, any more than the discovery of a group of humans who do not walk upright would disprove our innate capacity for bipedalism. Alternatively, one could argue that any linguistic structure containing more than two elements must feature binary Merge and is hence recursive, and so Everett’s observations regarding Pirahã syntax are beside the point.
What is at stake in these debates is more than either the question of the correct analysis of various syntactic structures in a range of languages (from Brazil or otherwise, Indo-European or otherwise, “exotic” or otherwise), or the correctness of an influential theory of language. These debates go deeper: they directly address the question of what it is to be human. The capacity for the acquisition of complex language under naturalistic conditions without explicit instruction is universal to, and unique to, human children. The human capacity for language underpins human culture, civilization and technology. Therefore, (4)our view of the essential nature of language profoundly informs our view of human nature, the human mind and human culture.

For Chomsky, as we saw from the brief summary of Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) above, the central property of language is the fact that sound and meaning (the two interfaces implicated in the FLB) can be related over an unbounded domain; Berwick and Chomsky (2015:1) refer to this as the Basic Property of human language. This is possible because the two interfaces are mediated by the syntactic component whose central formal property is Merge. Recursion lies at the very heart of the definition of the language faculty (broad or narrow). It is the cognitive capacity to manipulate symbols in a recursive fashion that is central to human nature. To the extent that this ability is not shared with other species, it must be somehow instantiated in the human genome, such that the genetic blueprint for building a human brain contains an “instruction” to create the neural substrate for such representations (in our current state of ignorance, we have no more idea as to how these representations are neutrally instantiated than we do of how any “higher” cognitive functions are). The ability to manipulate such structures emerges spontaneously in human development, as long as (and perhaps as soon as) a child is exposed to language. Somehow, at some stage since the human lineage diverged from that of the most closely related primates, this cognitive capacity must have evolved.

But there is more, at least arguably. The cognitive capacity to manipulate symbols using a recursive schema such as Merge may underlie other human abilities: our ability to manipulate numbers (Merge is formally very close to the successor function, the recursive function $S$ such that $S(n) = n + 1$ for every natural number $n$), our musical capacities, our moral sense and our capacity to recognize and ascribe content to other minds. Thus much of what many would agree makes us human may be traceable to a simple formal property of human mental computation. There is, moreover, a still deeper point at stake here, one with its origins in Cartesian philosophy: the recursive nature of syntax is a necessary component of what Chomsky has called the “creative aspect of language use”, i.e. the fact that humans are able to produce and understand utterances that have never been produced before. This formal property quite literally allows us to give expression to our freedom of will. So the postulation of the ability to produce recursive cognitive representations elegantly captures profound aspects of human uniqueness.

Everett’s view, on the other hand, takes culture as the central concept in understanding human language and human nature. Culture, rather than computation, is the key to the understanding of human nature (although Everett does not deny that humans are capable of recursive cognition; he merely asserts that it is not central to natural-language syntax). In order to understand the nature of human cognition, we must understand human culture and cultural evolution. Language, as the title of his 2012 book implies, a cultural tool: something that, like other tools, humans have invented; something that may vary greatly from culture to culture, and that has developed through cultural, rather than biological, evolution. The fundamental nature of language is determined by society, rather than by any property of the individual. Hence, since Pirahã culture differs profoundly from “Western” culture, it is no surprise that the Pirahã language should also differ profoundly from (Indo-)European languages, structurally and in many other ways too.

[Adapted from Amrani, Maia, Nevins and Roeper (eds.), Recursion across Domains, Cambridge University Press.]
問１ 下線部 (1) について、FLB と FLN の違いを本文に即して説明しなさい。

問２ 下線部 (2) について、具体制内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問３ 下線部 (3) を日本語に訳しなさい。
問4 下線部（4）に関する具体的な2つの考えを本文に即して説明しなさい。
文(1)の意味は多義的であるが、(2)の文の意味は一義的である。
それぞれの文において許される意味を日本語で示し、(1)と(2)の対比を統語論の観点から説明しなさい。

(1) Mary did not cook the bread in order to prepare the meal.

(2) Mary did not cook the bread in order to please anyone.
[Ⅲ] 以下の日本語の文を英語に訳しなさい。

信号が赤になっていれば「止まれ」で、緑になっていれば「進め」（より正確には「進んでもよい」ということもだろう）ということは、子供がまっさきに教えられることのひとつである。それは、信号を守るということが、現在のわれわれの社会の重要な決まりのひとつであることを示している。もちろん、大人はみんな知っているように、だれもがいつも信号を守るわけではない。しかしながら、信号に関する決まりについて、それが守られている場合と、守られていない場合との区別があるということは、だれもが認めることである。規則は決まりが意味をもつのは、それを守った場合と、守らなかった場合とが区別されるときだけであって、どんなことをしても守られたことになるような規則や決まりはそもそも、規則や決まりとは言えないだろう。

【飯田隆『規則と意味のパラドックス』（ちくま学芸文庫）より一部変更】