

2020年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程前期2年の課程入学試験

(秋期・一般選抜) 問題

外国語 英 語

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外国語 (英 語)

問題【Ⅰ】と問題【Ⅱ】について日本語で解答しなさい。ただし、外国人受験者にかぎり問題【Ⅰ】の代わりに問題【Ⅲ】を選択できます。

【Ⅰ】 次の英文を読んで設問に答えなさい。

We may begin with the most obvious sort of value that a life has – namely, the *Personal Value* that a life has for its subject. This is the value that my life has for me and your life has for you.

The idea that something has value “for you” is easily misunderstood. It can be taken in two ways. First, it may suggest that we are dealing only with personal opinions and tastes – something is good “for you” just in case you believe it is important or you care about it. (Others, of course, may not believe it is important and may not care about it, so it would not be good “for them.”) Often, this notion is introduced to insinuate that, despite your fondness for something, it has no real value: (1)“Yes, I suppose country music is good, for you.” This interpretation of the relativizing clause comes most immediately to mind, and it is tempting to understand the Personal Value of human life in this way.

But there is a second interpretation. Consider the sense in which your eyes are important to you. It is not merely that you believe they are valuable, nor is it merely that you care about them. Your eyes are important to you in the sense that *you are the one who benefits from them* and *you are the one who would be harmed if anything happened to them*. In a perfectly plain sense, you – not me or your neighbor or your cousin Harry – are the one who stands to lose if your eyes are damaged. The loss would be real and not just a matter of opinion or taste. You really would be worse off without them.

Your life has value “for you” in this second sense. You would be harmed by its loss, just as you would be harmed by the loss of your eyesight or your hearing. The loss of your life, of course, is more comprehensive, inasmuch as your life includes virtually everything you hold dear – your enjoyments, activities, relationships, desires, aspirations, projects, achievements, and a great deal more. That is why your death would be, from your own point of view, not just unfortunate but catastrophic.

(2)We can be a little more specific about what we value when we value our lives. There is a difference between being alive, in the merely biological sense, and having a life, in the sense of a biography that includes enjoyments, activities, and all the rest. This is worth noting because, while the practical issues of life and death often concern the preservation of mere biological life, it is biographical life that is important to us. The point may seem obvious, but if an argument is needed, one is not hard to find. Consider this thought-experiment. Suppose we are given a choice between (a) dying now and (b) lapsing into a dreamless coma from which we will never awaken and dying after ten years. Which would we choose? Most of us would prefer the first option, both because we would find the prospect of a vegetable existence undignified and because we would not want to put our loved ones through the pointless ordeal of caring for our unconscious bodies. But in an obvious sense the choice is indifferent: (3)when we enter the coma, our biographical lives are over in the same way as if we had died. In the coma, of course, we would still be alive; and if being alive mattered, then we should prefer that option. The reason we do not is that being alive has no value for us if it does not enable us to have some sort of biographical life.

In addition to the Personal Value that a life has for its subject, there is also the *Social Value* that one's life has for others. People have friends and family to whom their lives are important. This is in part an instrumental value; other people may depend on them in various ways. But this value may be more than merely instrumental; their friends and family may love them and value them for their own sakes. The Social Value of most people's lives is limited, but some people's lives may have great Social Value because of what they contribute to society as a whole.

The idea that lives have Personal Value and Social Value is relatively uncontroversial. It is accepted by almost everyone. Now one possible view is that these two kinds of value are all that exist. The *Total Value* of a life, we might say, is just the sum of its Personal Value and its Social Value. We may call this (4) *the Simple View*.

If we take this view, there will be practical implications. Suppose, for example, the issue is whether we may transplant the organs of an *anencephalic baby to other infants. This is obviously desirable in at least one respect: it could save the lives of the babies who need transplants. But many moralists argue that this would be impermissible because taking the organs would kill the anencephalic baby. As one commentator put it, "It's unethical to kill person A to save person B." If we take the Simple View, however, we may not appeal to the value of the infant's life as an argument against the transplants.

—from James Rachels, *The Legacy of Socrates*

(注) *anencephalic 無脳症の

問1 下線部(1)を日本語に訳しなさい。

問2 下線部(2)を日本語に訳しなさい。

問3 下線部 (3) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問4 下線部 (4) the Simple View の内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

【 II 】 次の英文を読んで設問に答えなさい。

I'm not interested in transcendental cosmic profundity, I'm interested in how the mind works. (1)The first thing we have to settle is which sense of *consciousness* we're talking about. If we have in mind the "process" sense (*Pat is conscious of the noise*), the question could be rephrased as: "What's going on when someone is conscious of something?" If we're thinking of the "vessel" sense (*The noise entered Pat's consciousness*), the question could be: "When someone is conscious of something, where is the relevant action going on?"

There's a very traditional view, most prominently associated with Descartes, that the "vessel of consciousness" is the same thing as the mind. If someone isn't conscious of something, it simply hasn't "entered their mind." In this view, being conscious or having a mind is one of the Big Things that Make Us Human. For Descartes, consciousness and the mind are part of the nonphysical soul, so they're outside the purview of physical investigation.

According to this view, animals are mere machines (these days maybe we'd say they "only operate by instinct"). They lack souls, rationality, minds, language, and moral responsibility. They're *unconscious*. Instinct is *mere* instinct or *brute* instinct, something less than rational, something to be devalued.

Sometimes human emotions also go in this "lower" animal category or at least negative and selfish emotions like lust, greed, and gluttony do. In order to achieve our true humanity, we're supposed to try to suppress these bad impulses, rise above them. On the other hand, certain other emotions like pure love of God and transcendental ecstasy are sometimes considered higher and more valuable than even reason. It depends who you talk to.

In the early 20th century, Freud proposed that beneath the "vessel" of consciousness is the deep, dark, roiling, scary domain of the unconscious, full of forbidden and threatening thoughts and motives. Freud's vision of the mind entailed a wrenching conceptual shift that took a long time to take hold. Even as late as the 1950s, the journalist Max Eastman could write of Freud's theory, "Brain action can be unconscious, and largely is, but to be mind and to be unconscious is, if words are to have genuine meaning, a contradiction in terms." Wittgenstein, writing around the same time, seems to equate "mental" and "conscious" too at least he never talks about the "unconscious mind." Nowadays, though, anyone who does psychotherapy takes Freud's perspective for granted (even if the contents of the unconscious may be a lot different than Freud thought).

Around the same time, the behaviorists, led by John B. Watson and later B. F. Skinner, took a different tack, and proclaimed that science could and should only investigate the mechanical aspects of humans their behavior. Talking about minds, they said, is all superstition. (2)Look how much science gained when it stopped attributing desires and intentions to rocks. We could make even more progress if science would only stop attributing them to humans too. As for consciousness, forget it! A taboo subject.

The second half of the 20th century gave birth to the "cognitive revolution." The brain came to be thought of as an information-processing device, sort of like a computer. Older readers will remember that the early computers were nicknamed "electronic brains." And of course computer scientists borrowed the term "memory" from its counterpart in humans. (Then the computer term was borrowed *back* when we started talking about people "retrieving things from their memory *banks*" computer memories in those days were huge racks of vacuum tubes and about people's memories being "full.")

Since the beginning, computers have been routinely described from (3)two perspectives. The “hardware” perspective describes what goes on in the physical device: the power supply, the layout of circuits, the changes of voltage in each circuit, and how each physical part of the computer contributes to the activity of other parts. The “software” perspective talks about the *logic* of what the computer is doing: the structure of programs and how they manipulate data structures (which may include other programs). These perspectives aren’t independent. Everything going on in the software has to be physically supported by something going on in the hardware. Otherwise the computer couldn’t do what it does from the software perspective – it doesn’t work by magic. But usually we don’t have to know how the hardware works – only the engineer and the repairman do. We can act as though the computer just carries out the software instructions, period. For all we care, as long as it works, it might as well *be* magic.

These two perspectives on computers made it attractive to think in a similar way about the brain and the mind. The brain plays a role like the physical computer, with neurons instead of transistors and blood vessels instead of a power supply. But we can also think of the brain as processing information or performing computations, and we can ask about the logical structure of this information and these computations. This is a version of the cognitive perspective, going back to pioneers such as John von Neumann.

Cognitive scientists often use the word *mind* (or *mind/brain*) for this perspective, but it’s quite different from the Cartesian or even the Freudian notion of the mind. For instance, the basic approach of modern linguistics is to think of language users as having a system of principles in their heads. But when we talk about the rules of grammar or of phonological structure being in the mind, we’re not talking about anything conscious. Speakers can’t tell you what the principles are, and no process like psychotherapy can uncover them. The principles are as inaccessible to introspection as the condition of your spleen. Speakers just use them intuitively – that is, unconsciously. This makes no sense in the traditional perspective that equates “mental” and “conscious.”

(4)This computational notion of the mind is an advance on the behaviorists – it does admit there’s such a thing as a mind that’s worth investigating scientifically. But it still looks at the mind/brain as a mechanical system, subject to the laws of physics, and it actually doesn’t have much to say about consciousness. To be sure, it says that some of the information in the mind, such as the rules of grammar, are unconscious. But it doesn’t say why any of the information in the mind should be *conscious*. Why isn’t *everything* unconscious? Consciousness doesn’t seem to play much of a role in this picture.

There’s a more serious problem. In the ordinary perspective, a *person* is conscious of *something in the world*. It makes no sense to say a *brain* is conscious of its *neural firings*, or that a mind (in the computational sense) is conscious of information that it’s processing. This is even true when we’re talking about imagery. If you hear the Joycean stream of consciousness, or if you dream of a flying cow, it’s not because there are words or a flying cow actually in your head. From the brain perspective, there are only neural firings in there, not too different from the neural firings when you hear spoken words or see real cows. From the computational perspective, there are only data structures (or “mental representations”) in there, being manipulated by computational processes.

But the computational perspective on brain and mind can still help us make sense of the question “What is consciousness?” Your experiences depend on what’s going on in your brain. (5)If you take drugs that alter the operation of your brain, or if you suffer brain damage, it affects not only your behavior but your experience. When you’re recognizing a face, different parts of your brain are active than when you’re recognizing buildings. If your skull is opened for brain surgery and different parts of your brain are electrically stimulated, you may report various experiences: tingles in parts of your body, hearing tunes, nostalgic memories, and so on.

To understand the connection between stuff going on in your brain and your having an experience, we need to ask: How can *anything* in the mind/brain, whether we regard it as neural firings or as information manipulation, add up to *experience*? This is the traditional mind-body problem, where (6)“mind” is understood in the traditional sense, not the computational sense.

—from Ray Jackendoff, *A User's Guide to Thought and Meaning*

問1 下線部 (1) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問2 下線部 (2) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問3 下線部 (3) の内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問4 下線部 (4) の内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問5 下線部 (5) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問6 下線部 (6) の内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

【Ⅲ】（この問題を選択できるのは外国人受験者のみです。）

Instead of answering Question I, only foreign students can choose to write an essay in English on “The Task of Humanities in the Age of Globalism.” Your essay should be more than 200 words in length.

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.