２０２０年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程後期３年の課程入学試験

（　春期・一般選抜　）問題

筆記試験　　英　語　学　　専攻分野

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。

受験記号番号	

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専門科目（ **英語学** 専攻分野）

次の英文を読んで設問に答えなさい。

As discussed in the introduction to the first (1995) edition, the essays included here draw from ongoing work from the late 1980s through the early 1990s.

(A) It is important to recognize that the Minimalist Program (MP) under development in this work, and since, is a *program*, not a *theory*, a fact that has often been misunderstood. In central respects, MP is a seamless continuation of pursuits that trace back to the origins of generative grammar, even before the general biolinguistics program, as it is now often called, began to take shape in the 1950s.

In particular, a leading concern from the outset had been to clarify the concept "simplest grammar" and to determine how to choose the simplest grammar for each language. The basic reasons are just normal science. Since Galileo, modem science has been guided by his maxim that nature is simple and that it is the scientist's task to show that this is the case. It has long been clear that the quest for simplicity is closely related to the quest for explanation, matters clarified by the important work of Nelson Goodman at midcentury.

As discussed in the 1995 introduction, two distinct notions of simplicity were pursued in early generative grammar: the general notion that Goodman sought to sharpen, holding of rational inquiry generally; and a theory-internal evaluation procedure designed to select the optimal grammar for given data, within the format determined by Universal Grammar (UG), which is understood in the modem literature to be the theory of the biological endowment of the relevant components of the faculty of language (FL). In effect, this yields an abstract language acquisition device—but one that is unfeasible, as was recognized at once.

A more specific concern arose as the biolinguistic framework took shape starting in the 1950s. Any complication of UG poses barriers to some eventual account of the evolution of FL. There is, then, an additional and compelling reason to seek the simplest formulation of UG, eliminating stipulations, redundancy, and other complications, insofar as possible. MP is the current version of this quest, within the general framework under consideration here.

MP was a natural development after the crystallization of the principles-and-parameters framework (P&P) in the early 1980s. P&P overcame fundamental quandaries of the earlier framework, eliminating the need for an evaluation procedure, as discussed in the 1995 introduction. That leaves us with only the general notion of simplicity and the specific concern for reducing UG to the minimum, now motivated in addition by concern about language origins that began to be discussed more seriously, but without much progress, in the 1970s.

P&P has been pursued very productively, making available a vast array of new empirical materials in languages of great typological variety, studied in much greater depth than heretofore. It has also revitalized psychology of language, historical and comparative linguistics, and other related disciplines, and has led to innovative and highly insightful theoretical and empirical inquiry.

The 1995 introduction takes note of "a problem for the biological sciences that is already far from trivial: how can a system such as human language arise in the mind/brain ...?" The problem is no doubt a significant one. To address it seriously, one must satisfy two elementary conditions. The first is to determine as best one can the nature of the phenotype—that is, what has evolved, namely FL. One must begin with the most satisfactory version of UG. No biologist, for example, would present a proposal about the evolution of the eye without presenting a clear account—preferably, the best available one—of what an eye is. That is close to a truism, as is the second condition: pay attention to the empirical evidence about the origin of language.

The evidence is slim, but not zero. There are two empirical theses about the origin of language (and, it can be plausibly argued, little more than these). One, established with considerable confidence, is that there has been little if any evolution of FL since our ancestors left Africa, some 50,000-80,000 years ago. The second, proposed with fair confidence, is that not long before this, there is no reason to believe that language existed at all (Tattersall 2012). If so, then FL emerged suddenly (in evolutionary time), and we would expect it to be quite simple, its basic properties largely determined by laws of nature and by extralinguistic contingencies. Since language is clearly a computational system, the relevant laws of nature should include (and perhaps be limited to) principles of efficient computation. These considerations lend some independent reason to suspect that the research program of MP is on the right track.

While a direct continuation of work from the earliest days, MP did formulate **(B)**a new research program, sometimes called "approaching UG from below." Pursuing this program, we seek to formulate a "perfect" solution to the conditions that language must meet, and then ask to what extent the many complex and varied phenomena of actual languages can be accounted for in these terms. By *language* here is meant I-language, what was called *grammar* in earlier work, in one of the uses of this systematically ambiguous term.

The basic principle of language (BP) is that each language yields an infinite array of hierarchically structured expressions, each interpreted at two interfaces, conceptual-intentional (C-I) and sensorimotor (SM)—**(C)**the former yielding a "language of thought" (LOT), perhaps the only such LOT; the latter in large part modality-independent, though there are preferences. The two interfaces provide external conditions that BP must satisfy, subject to crucial qualifications mentioned below. If FL is perfect, then UG should reduce to the simplest possible computational operation satisfying the external conditions, along with principles of minimal computation (MC) that are language-independent. The Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT) proposes that FL is perfect in this sense.

SMT is not precisely formulated. MC can be interpreted in various ways, though some of its properties are uncontroversial, and reliance on these carries us a long way, as work stimulated by MP has shown. There is a plausible suggestion as to what the simplest computational operation is: Merge, as defined within MP. SMT accords with the guiding principle of the natural sciences, and there is reason to expect something like this to be correct on evolutionary grounds. But of course, evaluation of the thesis is based on the empirical consequences of pursuing it.

When the first edition of *The Minimalist Program* was published, the thesis seemed too extreme to be seriously proposed. In the years since, I think that skepticism has lessened considerably. Some results have emerged that seem to me to provide substantial evidence that this program is on the right track.

One result has to do with the strange property of displacement that is ubiquitous in natural language: phrases are understood both where they are heard and in a position that is not articulated. To take a very simple case, the sentence *Which book did John read?* is understood to mean roughly 'For which book X, John read the book X'; the phrase *which book* is interpreted both where it appears and as the direct object of *read,* where it is not articulated. The same holds for quite intricate expressions. Displacement had always seemed—to me in particular—a curious imperfection of language. Why should languages resort to this device in a very wide range of constructions? **(D)**Pursuit of SMT reveals that displacement with this property of multiple interpretation ("the copy theory of movement") is the simplest case. Some stipulation would be required to block it, and correspondingly, any devices designed to yield the result that comes free under SMT has an even heavier empirical burden to bear. This is a significant discovery, I think—too long in coming, and insufficiently appreciated, as are its consequences.

One immediate consequence is that SMT yields structures that are appropriate for C-I interpretation, but obviously wrong for the SM interface, where all copies but the hierarchically most prominent one are deleted (with interesting qualifications, which in fact support the conclusion). That follows from another application of MC: in externalization, reduce computation and articulation to the minimum. The result is that the sentences that are heard have gaps, leading to serious problems for parsing and perception, so-called filler-gap problems. We therefore have strong evidence that the basic design of language determines a crucial asymmetry between the two interfaces: the C-I interface is privileged; externalization in one or another

sensory modality (or none at all, as in thought) is an ancillary feature of language. If so, then specific uses of externalized language, such as communication, are peripheral to the core elements of language design and evolution of FL, contrary to widespread doctrine.

There is a great deal of additional evidence supporting this conclusion, and none that I know of that is inconsistent with it. One important case is another curious property of language: structure-dependence of rules, a universal property that has been a puzzle since the 1950s. As an illustration, consider such simple sentences as *Instinctively, eagles that fly swim* and *Can eagles that fly swim?* Here the initial adverb or auxiliary verb does not relate to the linearly proximal verb *fly;* rather, it relates to the linearly remote but structurally proximate verb *swim.* This observation holds for all relevant constructions in all languages, and it has been shown that children know the facts and make no errors as early as testing is possible (Crain and Nakayama 1987). It is next to inconceivable that these facts are learned. The long-standing puzzle is that the procedure that is universally rejected, based on linear distance, is computationally far simpler than the one that is universally adopted, based on structural distance. The only known reason is that linear order is simply not available to acquisition of I-language, even though it is everywhere in the data. **(E)**It appears that the internal system, biologically determined, observes SMT and therefore ignores linear order in favor of structural distance.

Linear order and other arrangements therefore appear to be reflexes of the SM modalities for externalization, having nothing particular to do with core elements of language design (though of course they have a variety of secondary effects). That conclusion fits with the very limited evidence about the origin of language. The SM systems long antedate the apparent emergence of language and do not seem to have been modified significantly afterward (not surprisingly, given the very brief time period prior to the departure of *Homo sapiens* from Africa).

It is a familiar fact that the complexity and variety of language appears to be localized overwhelmingly—and perhaps completely—in externalization (which includes Saussurean arbitrariness of the lexicon). In learning a language, the real problem is mastering externalization. Principles of semantic interpretation are virtually unlearnable, beyond the most superficial cases, and are probably simply determined by UG; and the same appears to be largely or completely true for the syntactic operations ("narrow syntax") that yield the structures at the C-I interface. A possible account of the origin of language is that some rewiring of the brain, presumably the result of some mutation, yielded the simplest computational operations for BP, including the link to some preexisting conceptual structures CS, providing a LOT. **(F)**Since this emergent system would have been subject to no selectional pressures, it would have assumed an optimal form in accord with natural law—specifically, MC—rather the way a snowflake forms. A subsequent task is to relate this system to some sensory modality for externalization, a nontrivial cognitive problem since input and output have no intrinsic relations (apart from possible effects of later adaptation). It is a task that can be solved in many ways, leading to the variety of languages, each easily subject to the effects of historical accident. There are doubtless constraints on how externalization takes place—the principles of morphology, phonology, prosody, and so on. But it may be that evolution played a slight role in establishing these constraints.

The general picture accords pretty well with what we know about language. The crucial question, of course, is to what extent SMT can in fact account for the relevant phenomena of language. There has, I think, been substantial progress in moving toward this goal, with some significant results, such as those just mentioned. Needless to say, there remain vast areas to explore to determine how far SMT can reach, but the prospects seem exciting and certainly challenging.

[Adapted from Noam Chomsky (2014), "Preface to the 20th Anniversary Edition," *The Minimalist Program*, 20th Anniversary Edition, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.]

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問 1　下線部（A）を日本語に訳しなさい。

問 2　下線部（B）の内容を説明しなさい。

問 3　下線部（C）を説明しなさい。

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問4　下線部（D）を説明しなさい。

問5　下線部（E）を説明しなさい。

問6　下線部（F）を説明しなさい。