

2021年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程後期3年の課程入学試験

(春期・一般選抜) 問題

筆記試験 西洋史 専攻分野

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。

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以下のⅠ、Ⅱからどちらかを選択して答えなさい。選択した番号も記すこと。解答紙は4枚目以降である。

Ⅰ. 以下の英文を全訳しなさい。註の番号は無視してよい。出典: Mark Hagger, *William: King and*

conqueror (London and New York, 2012), pp. 118-120 より抜粋。

William may have been personally pious, but he appointed men with a talent for administration to the bishoprics that became vacant during his reign, although he did nominate holy monks to his abbeys. Many of his later bishops were chosen from among his own chaplains, and thus well known to him, rather than unworldly, spiritual men. The heresy of simony (paying for ecclesiastical office) was certainly not as detestable to him as Orderic makes out, as one of Geoffrey of Montbray's relatives purchased the bishopric of Coutances for him in 1048. Hauled before the council of Reims in 1049 for this offence, Geoffrey was able to excuse himself by claiming that this was done without his knowledge – and although this was sufficient excuse for the council, it does not absolve William from guilt. William indulged in simony a second time with regard to the appointment of Remigius to Dorchester. The case eventually came before Pope Alexander II. The charges, so Eadmer tells us, were that,

having made a bargain with William, before he became king, he had in effect bought his bishopric from him by the service which he had rendered him by the outlay of much effort and of lavish expenditure on his behalf when he was setting out to subdue England.

It is a shame that Eadmer is not a little more explicit, but he does at least make it clear that Remigius was unable to excuse his actions and resigned his see to the pope – only to be almost immediately reinstated as a result of the intervention of Lanfranc.

William was also guilty of another abuse, nepotism (giving ecclesiastical office to relatives), when in 1049 or 1050 he appointed his half-brother, Odo, to the bishopric of Bayeux.¹³ At the time Odo was well under the canonical age to receive such office – he should have been at least 30 years old but was somewhere between 15 and 20. William no doubt felt it worthwhile to break the rules to get the right men into office. But he did so rarely, and if Gregory VII thought well of William regarding Church appointments, then perhaps we should too.

In all, William made 15 appointments to bishoprics in Normandy between 1035 and 1087. Most were members of the duke's own family, or representatives of other important families. For example, John of Ivry, bishop of Avranches and then archbishop of Rouen, was a son of Count Ralph of Ivry, and a nephew of Duke Richard I; Hugh, bishop of Lisieux, was the son of Count William of Eu and a grandson of Richard I (making him William's second cousin); and Archbishop Malger of Rouen was a son of Duke Richard

II. David Bates has said that 'often his bishops were clerks who had served as ducal chaplains',¹⁴ but this seems not to be the case in Normandy. Only three of them were chaplains – that is, they had served in William's own household. Among them was Gilbert Maminot, bishop of Lisieux, who was remembered as able but lazy, an inspiring teacher and priest but a gambler and huntsman.

In England lesser men tended to be appointed to the bishoprics. William appointed 16 English bishops, and 11 of them were royal chaplains.

Lanfranc himself was one of William's greatest appointments.¹⁵ He had grown up at Pavia in Italy, and had come to Normandy after studying at Tours and Chartres. In Normandy he set up a school at Avranches where he taught the liberal arts. While he was there his devotion and desire for a religious life increased, and so, in around 1042, he left the city in search of a place where there were no *litterati* to honour and revere him. According to one story, he was robbed and abducted while travelling towards Rouen. Abandoned by his attackers, he sought out the poorest monastery in the area. He arrived at the recently founded abbey of Le Bec to discover the abbot, Herluin, constructing an oven with his own hands. He sought and gained entry to the community.

In c. 1045 he was made prior of Le Bec and in 1063 he was appointed abbot of William's newly founded abbey of Saint-Etienne in Caen. As this promotion indicates, Lanfranc was by this point a close confidant of the duke. William of Poitiers says that Duke William,

admitted to his closest circles a certain Lanfranc, of whom it was disputed whether he deserved respect and glory more for his remarkable knowledge of secular and divine learning or for his outstanding observance of the monastic rule. William venerated him as a father, respected him as a teacher, and loved him like a brother or son.

This being the case, it is hardly surprising that when Archbishop Stigand of Canterbury was deposed at Easter 1070, King William summoned Lanfranc, already between about 55 and 60 years old, to England and gave him the archbishopric in his place. Lanfranc was initially reluctant, but was persuaded to accept by the papal legates, who convened for the purpose a council of all the Norman clergy. He subsequently presided over the reorganization of the English Church, held a number of Church councils and sent letters to colleagues, monks and laymen, encouraging or rebuking them as necessary. He also succeeded in gaining the primacy for Canterbury in 1072, defeating York's claims for parity, although only for his rival's lifetime. This was essential if Lanfranc was to reform the English Church as he wished. And he proved his loyalty to William on many occasions.

II. 次の英文を読み、以下の (1) ~ (3) の設問に答えなさい。

①

Victory in the Second World War provided a rich story of patriotism and heroism for the triumphant Allies. Albeit economically and demographically crippled, the Soviet Union emerged out of the deadly battle that nearly destroyed it, as a superpower, commanding respect and fear from its neighbours, admirers and former friends. After the October Revolution, the war became a second founding myth for the regime eager to show off the achievements of the socialist system. To that end, the regime tweaked and embellished the country's war record, creating a narrative which, in time, was adopted by the general population as the infallible truth and carried forward by the force of popular inertia.

One of the most pervasive wartime tales was the unprecedented and unmatched care for children who allegedly remained at the top of the state's priority list despite the trials and deprivations of total war. Yet, there was a deeper and darker layer to the heroic narrative. Undermining the carefully composed story were those whom, according to a proverb, a great war spawns together with the army of cripples and mourners – the 'army of thieves'. Millions of children joined the ranks of this army of beggars and criminals, but were ousted from collective memory and replaced with courageous child soldiers and selfless youthful workers.

The homeless and delinquent juveniles had already begun their trudge into obscurity during the war. It was decreed that all the records and statistical data (already hopelessly unreliable) pertaining to them should be kept secret;¹ not a single newspaper article published during the war betrayed the real state of affairs on the home front, and when on the rare occasion they did discuss displacement and deviance, these social ills were promptly blamed on the corrupting influence of the German invader. As fathers, and sometimes mothers, were leaving for the front, national newspapers reassured them that their families would be taken care of in their absence. The editorials offered descriptions of clean and airy boarding institutions, patriotic citizens adopting orphans and smiling youngsters thanking the state for its familial care. The leadership needed the parents and older siblings at the front to concentrate on winning the war, while it made sure that public order was preserved in the rear at all costs. In doing so, the government resorted to well-tested repressive methods, exacerbating the already harsh conditions of the emergency situation. Consequently, the growing social problem of child homelessness and delinquency was both the result of circumstances outside the state's control and its own actions. It was a combination of ideology, tradition and politics, warped by the exigencies of total warfare that had devastating consequences for Soviet society and many of its younger members.

It is difficult to deny the Soviet state its genuine efforts to better the lives of children. It is also clear, however, that during the war, the romanticized conception of childhood was at least temporarily adjusted, as the state adopted a distinctly exploitationist attitude towards youngsters, employing punishment to ensure their obedience and full participation in the war effort. Its behaviour became increasingly contradictory – as it proclaimed the children's well-being as the highest priority, the state forced scores of them onto the streets, clamping down on the slightest signs of deviance; and while it expected both humanitarian treatment and efficiency in the prevention and correction of juvenile delinquency, it failed to implement either in practice. What on paper looked like a positive undertaking, in reality remained a mere declaration of intention.

The underlying causes of such a striking discrepancy lay not only in the obvious shortages of resources, but also in the so-called 'human factor'. Mirroring the initial situation in the Red Army, the Soviet administrative structure was plagued by rigidity, lack of initiative and general disorder, which, in turn, engendered nepotism, corruption, incompetence and mismanagement. The mistreatment of displaced children was not a deliberate state policy; rather, the children often became unintended victims of narrow-minded, incompetent, corrupt and indifferent individuals in positions of power. Furthermore, senior bureaucrats refused to acknowledge the fact that their own requests were often contradictory and dismissive of the difficulties faced by those implementing them. The central government imposed requirements on lower level representatives without providing adequate funding yet expecting maximum results. With few exceptions, it turned a blind eye to much dysfunction and wrongdoing, generally limiting its participation to issuing orders but not following them through. Even more crippling for the child protection services than the inefficiency of the system and the strains of the war effort was the attitude of the Stalinist government to social welfare as a 'soft-line' concern. Bent on industrial growth and military build-up, and unwilling to recognize certain social problems, some of which it itself generated, the 'warfare state', pretending to be a welfare one, made a conscious choice to prioritize public order over child well-being, thereby allowing those implementing central orders to ignore them if the latter contradicted local agendas.

出典 : Olga Kucherenko, *Soviet Street Children and the Second World War: Welfare and Social Control under Stalin*, New York, 2018.

- (1) 傍線部①を日本語に全訳しなさい。
- (2) _____部 (such a striking discrepancy) の内容について、本文の論旨に即して具体的に説明しなさい。
- (3) _____部 (the so-called 'human factor') の内容について、本文の論旨に即して具体的に説明しなさい。

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