

2022年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程前期2年の課程入学試験

(秋期・一般選抜) 問題

専門科目Ⅰ 英 語 学 専攻分野

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[Ⅰ] 次の英文を読んで設問に答えなさい。

This chapter is about definiteness, and more specifically about the difficulties involved in getting clear on which noun phrases (NPs) should be classified as definite, or more properly, which NPs have uses which can be so classified. (I use ‘NP’ here the way many linguists now use ‘DP’. I also use ‘CNP’, following Montague 1973, to mean ‘phrase of the category of common nouns’, i.e., for the head N plus any restrictive modifiers.) Intuitively, as a rough first approximation, an NP should be considered definite only if it can be used to talk about some particular entity, where an entity may be either concrete or abstract, and may be a group of entities, or a mass of stuff. Many people agree that there are at least four categories which have such uses: proper names, definite descriptions, demonstrative descriptions, and (personal and demonstrative) pronouns. (A) However, the question arises whether these are the only kinds of NPs that deserve the label ‘definite’, and if so why. As we will see, universally quantified NPs, partitives, possessive NPs, and specific indefinites all raise issues concerning definiteness.

The possible role of definiteness within early Chomskyan approaches to English grammar arose in connection with NONCONTEXTUALIZED (Abbott 1993) existential (‘there-be’) sentences. Such existentials, which may occur discourse initially, do not allow all NP types, as illustrated in (1) and (2).

- (1) a. There was a/some (student’s) dog in the yard.
b. There were some/several/many/too few/no dogs in the yard.
- (2) a. * There was Bill/it in the yard.
b.* There was the/tha t/every/each/neither/Mary’s dog in the yard.
c.* There were all/most/both (of the) dogs in the yard.

As indicated, the NPs following ‘be’ in (1) are welcome in this type of existential while those in (2) are not.

Initially the distinction was thought to be one of definiteness and the term ‘definiteness effect’ is often used to describe these differences in felicity. Gary Milsark’s classic work on this topic (1974, 1977) revealed many of the complications surrounding this criterion of definiteness, and it is to his credit that he created the new terms WEAK and STRONG for those NPs which can—and cannot—occur felicitously in an existential. Based on examples like those above in (1) and (2), we may sort NPs (and determiners) into two categories as shown in (3).

- (3) Weak: a/some (student’s) dog, some/several/many/too few/no dogs
Strong: Bill, it, the/tha t/every/each/neither/Mary’s dog, all/most/both dogs

As can be seen, our basic four kinds of definites (proper names, definite and demonstrative descriptions, and pronouns) do not occur felicitously in non-contextualized existentials and are correspondingly classified as strong. In the case of possessive NPs ('a/some student's dog', 'Mary's dog'), it appears that the weakness or strength of the genitive NP determiner is transferred to the NP as a whole. **(B)**Compare too the related example in (4).

(4) There was the wedding photo of a young black couple among his papers.

The underlined focus NP in this example is intuitively in the same class with the possessives, but with a postposed 'possessor' phrase ('a young black couple').

There are at least a couple of potential difficulties here. One concerns the universally quantified NPs—those with 'all', 'every', or 'each' (hereinafter the 'universals'). They are intuitively definite in many of their uses, so their exclusion from existentials seems natural. However they are often considered not to be definite, especially if definiteness is associated with referentiality, which is traditionally **opposed** to quantification. But then, part of my purpose is to question these traditional oppositions.

On the other hand NPs with 'most' as determiner are more problematic. They do seem intuitively to be indefinite. Consider a sentence like the following:

(5) When the power went off, most students headed for the dorm.

This sentence does not specify which actual students are involved—the speaker clearly does not intend to be talking about any particular students. It is true that morphologically, 'most' is a superlative—thus requiring the definite article in its adjectival use. However the definiteness in this case seems to be associated with the quantity involved rather than the denotation of the NP as a whole. (That is, assuming 'most students' amounts to more than half of them, the complement of this group does not allow another subset as big.) **(C)**So the exclusion of NPs with 'most' presents a genuine problem for viewing non-occurrence in a non-contextualized existential as an adequate criterion for definiteness.

Let us turn to Russell's classic analysis of definite descriptions, as well as some additions and modifications that have been proposed for it. Following that we turn to more recent variations on the uniqueness theme, and see how well it applies to other sorts of NPs which are usually considered to be definite.

As is well known, Russell (1905) analyzed denoting expressions quantificationally. (6) and (7) below show the difference between indefinite and definite descriptions, in his view.

-
- (6) a. A representative arrived.
 b. $\exists x$ [representative (x) & arrived (x)]
- (7) a. The representative arrived.
 b. $\exists x$ [representative (x) & $\forall y$ [representative (y) $\rightarrow y = x$] & arrived (x)]

On this analysis, definite descriptions share with indefinites an implication of existence of an entity meeting the descriptive content of the CNP. (Following Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950), this element of content may be viewed as PRESUPPOSED in the case of definite descriptions.) For Russell, the crucially differentiating element was the implication that this descriptive content apply uniquely—spelled out in the underlined portion of (7b). The formal analysis shown above in (7b) can be extended to definite descriptions with mass or plural heads, as shown by Sharvy (1980; see also Hawkins 1978). In such cases it is the totality of stuff or entities that is in question.

Definite descriptions like ‘the representative’ in (7a) are called ‘incomplete’ or ‘indefinite’, since there is an abundance of representatives in the world. In order to maintain Russell’s analysis we must assume that the uniqueness element in (7b) is relativized to context in some way. The issue of incomplete definite descriptions is a complex one which we will skip over for the most part here.

It is important to note that the uniqueness aspect of Russell’s analysis is separable from the quantificational aspect. That is, definite descriptions could be seen as simple referring expressions (as in the views of both Frege and Strawson) which nevertheless require unique applicability of their descriptive content. This is true of the approach of Löbner (1985, 2000), according to which the definite article is a marker of ‘functionality’, in the sense that the CNP with which it is combined is taken to denote a function from contexts to individuals. Some CNPs (e.g., ‘king of France’, ‘first person to swim the English Channel’, ‘claim that pigs can fly’) do this automatically; Löbner (1985) termed these SEMANTIC DEFINITES. The others (e.g., ‘representative’, ‘red car’, ‘person who called last night’) he called PRAGMATIC DEFINITES. (Rothschild 2007, apparently unfamiliar with Löbner’s work, introduced the terms ROLE TYPE and PARTICULARIZED for the two subcategories, respectively.) Incomplete definite descriptions, noted above, fall into Löbner’s category of pragmatic definites. Löbner (2000) argued specifically against any interpretation of definite descriptions as quantificational.

It will be useful to distinguish two distinct but closely related ways in which an NP could be described as ‘uniquely referring’. **(D)**If Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, as amended by a suitable approach to incomplete descriptions, correctly captures their contribution to the truth conditions of utterances in which they appear, then the essence of definite descriptions is that there is at most one thing (which may be an atomic entity or a group or mass individual) in the relevant context or situation which matches that descriptive content. Let us call this SEMANTIC UNIQUENESS.

There is another way of viewing uniqueness, which takes into account the goals a speaker has with respect to their addressee. On this view, the essence of definiteness in a definite description is that the speaker intends to use it to refer to some particular entity, and (crucially) expects the addressee to be able to identify that very intended referent (cf. the concepts of ‘unique identifiability’ and ‘individuation’ discussed by Birner and Ward 1998: 121f; and see also Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski 1993). This is a pragmatic property which I have called REFERENTIAL UNIQUENESS (Abbott 2010) (cf. Löbner’s (1985) functional analysis, and also the remarks of Bach 2004: 203).

We must now check to see how well the idea of uniqueness fits the other categories of NP which are commonly considered to be definite. We'll start with proper names and then move on to pronouns. For the purposes of this discussion, it will help to separate demonstrative pronouns from the personal pronouns, and group them instead with demonstrative descriptions.

It seems clear that proper names are similar to definite descriptions in possessing both semantic and referential uniqueness. First, proper names present themselves as being associated with a single referent; the term 'proper' indicates this property, which is also reflected in the fact that proper names in English, used as such, constitute a complete NP and do not accept determiners or restrictive modifiers. (E) On the pragmatic side, as with definite descriptions, speakers can expect their addressees to be able to determine, from the use of a proper name, who or what is being spoken about as long as those addressees are already familiar with the name and its referent.

(F) When we consider personal pronouns it quickly becomes clear that most of them are not semantically unique. Third person pronouns in English incorporate only minimal descriptive content. Although this minimal content may occasionally apply uniquely in a constrained or shrunken universe of discourse, it need not, as shown most clearly by examples like the following (from Winograd 1972: 33):

- (8) The city councilmen refused the demonstrators a permit ...
a. ... because they feared violence.
b. ... because they advocated revolution.

The city councilmen and the demonstrators are both plural objects suitable for the pronoun 'they'. However, importantly, in the pair of sentences in (8), the content of the predication makes it clear who is being referred to. Use of a pronoun in a context in which a typical addressee would **not** be able to determine a referent uniquely results in infelicity, as in (9).

- (9) # I told Sue and Betty about the problem, and she said she would work on it.

So it seems that use of a personal pronoun shares with uses of definite descriptions and proper names an assumption that the addressee is expected to be able to determine a referent uniquely—they are referentially unique.

Demonstratives are different from the kinds of definite NP we have been considering in requiring (in their demonstrative uses) some kind of 'demonstration' (pointing, nod, etc.) from the speaker. Such indicators may of course be used with other definites, but the other kinds of definite NP do not incorporate this requirement as a part of their semantics. As a result, as pointed out by King (2001: 27), a single demonstrative phrase may be used repeatedly in an utterance for different intended referents, unlike definite descriptions or personal pronouns:

- (10) a. I want that cookie, and that cookie, and that cookie.
b. # I want the cookie, and the cookie, and the cookie.
(11) a. I want that, and that, and that.
b. # I want it, and it, and it.
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(G)The requirement of a demonstration helps demonstratives achieve referential uniqueness without semantic uniqueness.
As we have seen, definite descriptions, proper names, pronouns, and demonstratives all seem to share referential uniqueness—an intention on the part of the speaker using them to speak about a particular entity which they assume that the addressee should be able to identify. Thus this property has a strong claim to be the essence of definiteness. (H)Furthermore, if that claim holds up then it would seem that the universals (those NPs with ‘all’, ‘every’, or ‘each’ as determiner) should also be included in the category of definite NPs, since in at least some of their non-generic uses their denotation should similarly be identifiable to an addressee.

[adapted from Barbara Abbott, “The Indefiniteness of Definiteness”, in *The Oxford Handbook of REFERENCE*, Oxford University Press]

問 1 下線部 (A) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問 2 下線部 (B) について、例文 (4) の文法性がどのように説明されるかを本文に即して説明しなさい。

問3 下線部 (C) について、具体的内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問4 下線部 (D) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問5 下線部 (E) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問6 下線部 **(F)** について、具体的内容を本文中の例文 (8) と (9) を使って説明しなさい。

問7 下線部 **(G)** について、具体的内容を本文中の例文 (10) と (11) を使って説明しなさい。

問8 下線部 **(H)** を日本語に訳しなさい。

【Ⅱ】以下の日本語の文を英語に訳しなさい。

「日本の英語教育は文法や読みのトレーニングに偏っている。話す、聞くを含めた4技能をバランスよく鍛えるべきだ」ということが昨今、強く主張されています。

このような言葉を耳にして「確かに大学受験の英語も大半が読み書き中心だし、そのせいで日本の学習者は英語を多少は読めても話すことができないのだな」と納得してしまう人もいるかもしれません。

4技能をバランスよく、という学習指針を否定するつもりは毛頭ありませんが、この傾向が読むことや書くこと、ひいてはその基礎となる英文法の学習を軽視することに結びつくとなれば、それは日本人の英語を読む力、書く力を崩壊させてしまうという意味でも、日本流の英語教育の強みを殺してしまうという意味でも、非常に危険なことだと思います。

【北村一真著『英語の読み方』（中公新書）より】
