

2022年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程後期3年の課程入学試験

(春期・一般選抜) 問題

筆記試験 社 会 学 専攻分野

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。

受験記号番号	
--------	--

1 / 7

成	
績	

2022年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程後期3年の課程入学試験

(春期・一般選抜) 問題

筆記試験 (社会学 専攻分野)

次の英文を読み、以下の問いに答えなさい。

問1 下線部 (1) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問2 下線部 (2) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問3 下線部 (3) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問4 本文全体の要旨を簡潔に説明しなさい。

問5 本文の内容を踏まえて、社会学の value freedom について、あなた自身の考えを説明しなさい。

(出典 : Martyn Hammersley, 2000, *Taking Sides in Social Research*, Routledge, pp.60-64)

Howard Becker's article, 'Whose side are we on?', published in 1967, has been very widely cited in the literature of the social sciences. Furthermore, there is considerable consensus about its message. It is generally taken to argue that sociologists are inevitably partisan, and that they should be explicitly so. Gouldner provided one of the earliest and most influential interpretations along these lines, even though he was critical of the kind of partisanship he took Becker's article to imply (Gouldner 1968). And we find much the same interpretation prevailing today. Thus, writing in 1995 about the work of the 'second Chicago School', Galliher describes the message of Becker's article as follows:

he argued that since some type of bias is inevitable in all research on human subjects, to gain a full understanding of the world it is essential that we consciously take the perspective of the oppressed rather than the oppressor.

And he adds that: 'Becker's labelling theory of deviant behavior is consistent with his admitted political bias' (Galliher 1995: 169-70). This is what I will call the radical reading of Becker's article, and I will begin by explicating it. Later, I will argue that, while there are important ambiguities, this interpretation of the article is misconceived.

The radical reading

(1) There are several features of 'Whose side are we on?' that seem to imply advocacy of partisanship. The title itself assumes that we are forced to choose sides. And this is reinforced in the opening section of the article where Becker rejects value freedom as impossible, and explicitly states that 'the question is not whether we should take sides, since we inevitably will, but whose side we are on' (1967: 239). Moreover, against the background of Becker's work in the sociology of deviance, the implication seems to be that we should side with those in a subordinate position; hence Gouldner's labelling of Becker's position as 'underdog sociology' (Gouldner 1968). Thus, what is proposed could be described as radical in political terms, even though Gouldner argues that it is not radical enough and may still function to support the liberal establishment.

Furthermore, on this reading Becker's article involves epistemological as well as political radicalism. For example, he remarks that: 'there is no position from which sociological research can be done that is not biased in one way or another' (1967: 245). The implication, it may seem, is that there is no objective viewpoint: people in different social locations necessarily have different perspectives, and the researcher must simply adopt one or other of these. This is the kind of relativism that has sometimes been associated with radical versions of the sociology of knowledge, in which 'truth' is no more than what passes for knowledge in a particular community, or what an individual decides is true for him or herself.

This radical reading of Becker's article probably accounts for much of its continuing popularity: it is consonant with the growing influence in many areas of the social sciences of both political and epistemological radicalism, in the form of 'critical' approaches, of constructionism, and of postmodernism. And, as already noted, support for this reading of the article can be provided by seeing it in the context of the labelling theory of deviance, to which Becker made a major contribution in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, we can treat the article as in some respects an application of labelling theory to the case of sociological work itself.

Labelling theory transformed the field of research on crime and deviance in several ways. Most obviously, it expanded the focus of enquiry to include the processes by which particular types of act, and particular people, come to be labelled as deviant. In this way, the labellers as well as the labelled became objects of study. More fundamentally, on some interpretations, deviance was no longer to be treated as an objective feature of the world whose character could be taken for granted in order to explain why it happened, why changes in its incidence took place, why some groups engaged in more crimes of particular kinds than others, and how crime rates could be reduced. Rather, what counts

as deviance was now treated as a matter of social definition, so that the labelling process came to be regarded as *constitutive* of deviance rather than as merely identifying independently existing offences more or less accurately. In other words, 'deviance' was defined as 'behaviour labelled as deviant', with labelling as a process of social construction that is open to sociological study, and that must be studied if work in the field is not simply to take over the common-sense perspective promulgated by powerful groups in society.

There were two main elements of the argument for this new focus on the social construction of deviance. First, it was pointed out that there is substantial variation across societies in what activities are and are not counted as offences, in either legal or moral terms, with changes in this occurring over time. Furthermore, it was argued that what is and is not an offence in a society in a particular period is to some extent the result of the work of moral entrepreneurs. Moral panics engendered by such entrepreneurs can result in major shifts in attitude towards various sorts of activity, on the part of both the public and government authorities. And, in this way, they can succeed in getting legislation passed to outlaw activities that had previously been legal; though, of course, there may also be campaigns to legalise what was previously prohibited. Changes in attitudes towards and laws about alcohol use, abortion and homosexuality are key twentieth-century examples.

The other main element of labelling theory was an emphasis on the contingency of the relationship between offence and punishment. There are several aspects of this. Different groups in society are subject to different levels of surveillance, so that offences on the part of some people are more likely to come to the attention of law enforcement agencies than are those of others. This is most obviously the case with those who have a criminal record, but it is also generally true in Western societies that the activities of the working class and of particular minority ethnic groups are subjected to greater surveillance than those of middle-class members of the ethnic majority. And further elements of contingency occur in the actual identification of offences, and in responses to them. First of all, the meaning of any rule involves an element of indeterminacy, so that judgement or decision-making is involved about whether it applies in a particular case. Secondly, even when an offence has been identified, discretion is exercised by onlookers in reporting it, and by the police in pursuing investigation of it, so that some types of people may be much more likely to be prosecuted than others, even for the 'same'

offence. Thirdly, the courts also involve contingencies that introduce further indeterminacy into the relationship between offence and outcome, for example as regards the securing of legal representation, and in the way that plea-bargaining and courtroom interaction operate.

(2) These two arguments – about intercultural variation in moral and legal rules, and about contingencies in their application – throw doubt on the idea that there are intrinsic differences in causal terms between deviant and non-deviant activities: the same behaviour will be judged deviant in some circumstances but not in others. Above all, labelling theory represents a challenge to the idea that deviants differ psychologically from non-deviants, perhaps suggesting more

generally that psychological explanations are of little use in this field. This is reinforced by the argument that even the most hardened criminal conforms to moral and legal rules most of the time: he or she is deviant only in some particular respect and on some occasions. On these grounds, it is insisted that deviant activities should be investigated by sociologists rather than by psychologists, and that this should be done in exactly the same way as with any other form of social activity, employing standard theoretical and methodological resources (see Polsky 1967). No difference in fundamental character should be assumed, even between the social organisation of crime and that of law enforcement. Both must be studied in much the same way. On top of this, some commentators also drew practical and political conclusions, for example in support of policies of 'radical non-intervention' (Schur 1973). Indeed, on some views, deviance was to be regarded as representing political resistance to the dominant social order (see Taylor et al. 1973).

Against the background of labelling theory, it is significant that in 'Whose side are we on?' Becker focuses primarily on *accusations* of bias, rather than on bias itself. He is mainly concerned with the conditions under which such accusations arise. He identifies two types of situation: what he calls the non-political and the political. In the former, there is a largely uncontested credibility hierarchy in terms of which those at the top of an organisation or community are assumed to know best. While subordinates may privately hold views that contradict official ones, they are not politically mobilised and their views are not publicised. In this situation, Becker suggests, accusations of researcher bias are likely to come from superordinates, and will arise only when the social scientist does not conform to official views, for example by taking seriously the dissident perspectives of subordinates. In the *political* situation, by contrast, there is a much more open conflict of views, with subordinates being mobilised against superordinates, and their perspectives promoted. As a result, there is no agreed credibility hierarchy. Here, accusations of bias can come from either or both sides, depending on the interpretations of the situation the sociologist adopts.

What this analysis implies is that, as with other kinds of deviance, 'bias' does not refer to some intrinsic feature of the behaviour involved: it is a matter of social definition. Accusations of bias are a product of the situation in which the sociologist works, and it must not be assumed that a research study that is accused of bias is defective or culpable in some naturally given sense. While it may be biased from one point of view, it need not be from others. For instance, it may be seen that way by the powerful but not by the powerless. And the conclusion drawn from this by those who adopt what I am calling the radical

reading of Becker's article is that the sociologist is simply faced with a choice about whose perspective to adopt, with bias being a function of the relationship between that decision and the dominant views within the situation studied. If (3) the researcher takes the point of view of the powerful, there are unlikely to be accusations of bias, at least in the non-political situation. However, if the point of view of subordinates is adopted, the sociologist will probably be accused of bias whatever the situation. On this radical reading of the article, 'bias' is a relative and contingent matter that depends on who is in power and the stance the researcher takes towards them.

受験記号番号	
--------	--

問1

問2

受験記号番号	
--------	--

5/7

問3

問4

問 5

受験記号番号

$$\frac{7}{7}$$
This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There is no text or other markings on the paper.