

2025年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程前期2年の課程入学試験

(夏期・一般選抜) 問題

専門科目 英語学 専攻分野

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専門科目 (英語学 専攻分野)

[I] 次の英文を読んで設問に答えなさい。

(i) Elided material must be recoverable somehow. It is generally agreed that elided material must be identical to its antecedent in order to guarantee the recoverability of ellipsis. However, the precise formulation of the identity condition of ellipsis is controversial. Some argue that elided material and its antecedent must be syntactically or formally identical while others argue that they must be semantically or pragmatically identical.

The first relevant discussion of ellipsis appears in Chomsky (1955). He begins by considering the following examples (p. 423):

- (1) a. I saw the play and so did he.
b. I will see the play and so will he.
c. I have seen the play and so has he.
d. I have been seeing the play and so has he.

For Chomsky, the derivation of such sentences involves a generalized transformation (conjunction), a permutation (exactly the same one used in simple yes-no questions), and a ‘deformation’ (deletion operation) eliminating the material after the first auxiliary. The first mention of an identity requirement appears here, but it is not the requirement one might expect (material to be deleted identical to an antecedent). Rather, Chomsky suggests that the *auxiliaries* must be identical:

- (2) *I will see the play and so did he.

“... the auxiliary phrases must be identical in the two conjuncts ... for the transformation ... to apply.” That is, material *outside* the ellipsis site must be identical.

Simple VP-ellipsis also comes under investigation, including now classic instances such as:

- (3) a. John will.
b. John is.
c. John has.
d. John does.

Again, Chomsky notes that “these appear to be ‘truncated’ sentences, with a verb phrase ‘understood’” and he indicates that formal analysis leads to the same conclusion, thus “providing grounds in formal linguistic structure for this intuition.” In particular, precisely the same analysis of the English verbal system that Chomsky had motivated to account for yes-no question alternations is efficacious in describing the

ellipsis patterns. Chomsky does point out an interesting problem that arises, **(ii)an apparent ordering paradox**. In the derivation of (3c), *have* and the perfect morpheme *en* were introduced together in the Aux. So to derive the correct output, it must be that the rule separating *en* from *have* and attaching it to the following verb (called Affix Hopping in later work) must precede the deletion rule, since that affix is included in the deletion site. (And likewise for (3b).) On the other hand, the tense affix in (3d) survives the deletion, so in this case, deletion must precede Affix Hopping. Chomsky's solution is to propose that there are two Affix Hopping rules, one preceding deletion, for *en* and *ing*, and another for tense, which follows deletion.

A syntactic recoverability condition on elided material is first explicitly articulated by Chomsky (1964). There are two instances. First, a "designated representative of a category" may be deleted. For instance, Chomsky hints that indefinite pronouns ('designated representatives' of the category NP) underlie interrogative ones and thus are deletable by the interrogative transformation. The second instance is more familiar: apart from a designated representative, "a transformation can delete an element only if ... the structural condition that defines this transformation states that the deleted element is structurally identical to another element of the transformed string" (p. 41). This formal identity condition guarantees that "A deleted element is ... always recoverable."

Chomsky (1965) explores this recoverability condition further. He first suggests, subject to later refinement, that "an erasure operation can use the term X to delete Y just in case X and Y are identical" (p. 145). Chomsky then considers the notion 'identity', indicating that it might be taken to mean "strict identity of feature composition" (p. 177). But he then gives a pair of examples showing that **(iii)this cannot be quite right**:

(4) John is more clever than Bill.

(5) These men are more clever than Mary.

Assuming a clausal source for comparatives, (4) works as expected, with *is clever* deleted under complete identity. But, Chomsky observes in (5) the antecedent for deletion of *is clever* is *are clever*, which is not fully identical. The problem is even more evident in the French analogue, where the deleted adjective is not completely identical to its antecedent: differing in the feature \pm plural, like the copula, and also in being +feminine:

(6) Ces hommes sont plus intelligents que Marie.

Based on this, Chomsky makes the intriguing suggestion that features added by agreement rules do not have the same status as features that are inherent parts of lexical items:

... in the case of Adjectives and the copula (also Verbs, which take part in similar rules) the inflectional features that are added by agreement transformations are apparently not considered in determining whether the item in question is strictly identical with some other item. (p. 180)

Even the plural feature of a nominal expression is not always inherent. Predicate nominals show the pattern of verbs and adjectives, as seen in (7)—reasonable since in this instance as well, the feature is triggered by agreement.

(7) I know several more successful lawyers than Bill.

Based on this, Chomsky offers (iv) two conclusions:

First, features introduced by transformation into lexical formatives are not to be considered in determining when deletion is permitted; a formative, in other words, is to be regarded as a pair of sets of features, one member of the pair consisting of features that are inherent to the lexical entry or the position of lexical insertion, the second member of the pair consisting of features added by transformation. Only the first set is considered in determining legitimacy of deletion in the manner previously described. Second, what is involved in determining legitimacy of deletion is not identity but rather nondistinctness in the sense of distinctive feature theory ... Thus consider once again the case of ‘I know several lawyers’—‘Bill is a lawyer.’ The Predicate-Nominal of the latter is not singular, in the base structure; rather, it is unspecified with respect to number exactly as the nasal is unspecified with respect to point of articulation in the lexical representations of the formatives *king*, *find*, *lamp*, etc. Hence, it is not *identical with* the corresponding nominal element of ‘I know several lawyers’; it is, rather, nondistinct from it, and the example suggests that this is sufficient to permit deletion. (p. 181)

Finally, Chomsky argues that this analysis need not be stated or even mentioned in any specific rules of grammar, since:

... it is, apparently, determined by a general convention regarding the form of grammar. In other words, we are tentatively proposing it for consideration as a linguistic universal, admittedly, on rather slender evidence ... If this proposal is a correct one, then the analysis of formatives that we have suggested is a general condition on the functioning of erasure transformations. (pp. 181-2)

In a further consideration of formal identity, Lasnik (1995b) presents an account of a surprising asymmetry in English VP ellipsis first noticed by Warner (1986) and rediscovered by Colbert (2007). Lasnik’s account is based on (v) a ‘hybrid’ approach to English verbal morphology, initially motivated by the divergent behavior of auxiliary and main verbs with respect to negative placement and Subject-Aux Inversion. In this hybrid approach, main verbs come to be associated with their verbal morphology (particularly their tense morphology) via Affix Hopping. Auxiliaries, on the other hand, are ‘lexicalist’, introduced into the syntactic derivation already fully inflected. The core of the ellipsis asymmetry is that finite forms of main verbs, but not of *be*, can apparently antecede deletion of infinitival forms:

(8) John *slept here*, and Mary will *sleep-here* too.

(9) *John *was here* and Mary will *be-here* too.

If, as Lasnik argued, *slept* is underlyingly *sleep* with a syntactically independent tense morpheme (as in Chomsky 1955 and 1957), there is a

stage in the derivation where *slept* and *sleep* are completely identical. On the other hand, if *was* is *was* throughout the derivation, there is no stage where it is identical to *be*, thus excluding (9), if there is a strict formal identity requirement on ellipsis:

- (10) A form of a verb *V* can only be deleted under identity with the very same form.

In further motivation of a formal identity requirement, Chung (2006) observes (vi)an extremely interesting constraint on ‘sprouting’, a type of sluicing where there is no apparent antecedent for the *wh*-trace (see Chung et al. 1995):

- (11) She solved the puzzle, but I don’t know how.

- (12) He ate, but I don’t know what.

It should be noted at the outset that sprouting raises non-trivial difficulties for any identity requirement, whether syntactic or semantic, as noted by van Craenenbroeck and Merchant (2013). One possibility briefly suggested by van Craenenbroeck and Merchant (2013) is that there is a null adjunct or null argument that does serve as an antecedent. Chung’s discovery is that when the missing antecedent would have been a PP, the sluicing fragment must also be a PP, and not a mere DP:

- (13) They’re jealous, but it’s unclear *(of) who.

- (14) Joe was murdered, but we don’t know *(by) who.

- (15) Mary was flirting, but they wouldn’t say *(with) who.

- (16) We’re donating our car, but it’s unclear *(to) which organization.

It is worthy of note that even when the preposition is predictable, as in some of the above examples, it still must show up in the sprouting construction. This is in sharp contrast with standard sluicing (in a language allowing preposition stranding, like English). In these instances, the preposition is optional (and probably even dispreferred) in the fragment:

- (17) They’re jealous of someone, but it’s unclear (of) who.

- (18) Joe was murdered by someone, but we don’t know (by) who.

The presence of some prepositions seems entirely formally motivated, as in (17) but even these must show up in sprouting. Significantly, this pattern in Chung’s examples is not unique to English. It shows up, as Chung points out, in other languages with preposition stranding, such as

Danish and Norwegian. Chung concludes that we must look beyond semantics and pragmatics to account for the contrasts. That is, there is a formal identity condition at work here.

[adapted from Lasnik, Howard and Kenshi Funakoshi, "Ellipsis in Transformational Grammar," in *The Oxford Handbook of Ellipsis*, Oxford University Press]

問1 下線部 (i) を日本語に訳しなさい。

問2 下線部 (ii) についてその内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問3 下線部 (iii) についてその内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問4 下線部 (iv) についてその内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問5 下線部 (v) についてその内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

問6 下線部 (vi) についてその内容を本文に即して説明しなさい。

[II] 以下の日本語の文を英語に訳しなさい。

さまざまな哲学の概念や理論はそれぞれが一個のレンズで、このレンズを使って見た風景と、別のレンズを使って見た風景と、その両方を通した風景はすべて違っているかもしれないし、そのどれかが正しいわけではないかもしれない。でもいろいろなレンズを通してみることで、裸眼で見たのとは違う風景の可能性に気づき、新しい仕方でも物事を理解したり語ったりしていくきっかけになるかもしれない。そんなふうに思います。ひょっとしたらそれは、私といまこの文章を読んでもくださっているあなたの、レンズを外した「裸眼」の風景の違いに気づくきっかけにもなるかもしれません。

【三木那由他『言葉の風景、哲学のレンズ』（講談社）】

[illegible]