2025年度

大学院文学研究科博士課程後期3年の課程入学試験

(冬期・一般選抜) 問題

筆記試験 倫理学 専攻分野

試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題冊子を開いてはいけない。

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(冬期・一般選抜) 問題

筆記試験(倫理学 専攻分野)

1と2の両方に解答してください。解答はすべて日本語で記入してください。

1. 以下の文章を全訳してください。解答は3枚目に記入してください。

(出典: Mark Timmons, Moral Theory: An Introduction, 2nd edition, Rowman and Littlefield, 2013, p. 305)

Moral particularism, like traditional moral theories, emphasizes the importance of the details of concrete situations in determining the morality of actions. But this view is far more radical in its claims about how the morality of an action often depends on such details. The moral particularist challenges the idea that it is possible to specify once and for all those features that are always going to be relevant in determining the rightness or wrongness of an action. Indeed, the particularist goes further and challenges what is perhaps the deepest assumption of traditional moral theory, namely that to properly explain the deontic status of particular actions requires an appeal to moral principles or rules. If this assumption is mistaken, then the project of traditional moral theory is itself deeply mistaken. And if, as we have been assuming, moral *theory* is all about articulating and defending explanatory moral principles, then moral particularism is aptly described as antitheory.

2. 以下の五点がどう Emotivism への反論になっているのか、それぞれ五行程度で簡潔に説明してください

(行数は目安です。厳守する必要はありません)。解答は4枚目から5枚目にかけて記入してください。

(出典: Noel Stewart, Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Polity, 2009, pp. 215–216)

Arguments against emotivism

- 1 Not all moral words are strongly or even mildly emotive. Take 'good', for example, as in 'Honesty is good'. Do you feel your pulses racing when you read this? Do you need a sedative to calm yourself down? Hardly, yet if this is supposed to work on your emotions, as the emotivists claim, it does a very poor job. The coolness with which we react indicates that this is closer to a statement of fact than an emotive outburst.
- 2 Emotivism doesn't capture moral language uniquely because lots of other types of discourse besides morality use emotive language; examples include advertising, politics, religion, and football. Yet it's supposed to be telling us just what is *distinctive* of moral language. Since it doesn't do this, it is incomplete as a theory.
- 3 When we're on our own trying to work out the right thing to do, it seems absurd for the emotivist to insist that all we're really doing is giving vent to our feelings rather than trying to discover some matter of fact, which is
 - what we think we're doing. Are our private moral 'reasonings' really pep talks in disguise, in which we go to work on ourselves in order to drum up the emotional enthusiasm to act? Surely the emotivists are wrong to think we're so deceived.
- 4 Emotivism can't properly analyse the situation where someone comes to you for moral *advice*. Clearly what they're looking for is some *reasoned guidance*, not some piece of *psychological manipulation* to which you subject them via the emotive power of your moral rhetoric. But, according to emotivism, all you can offer them is the chance to be *pressurized* into toeing your moral line. This seems an unsatisfactory analysis of what's going on.
- 5 Ultimately, emotivism reduces all moral debate to propaganda. It doesn't really matter whether you use valid or invalid arguments to influence your opponents, since there are no moral facts, no objectivity, and no truth or falsehood. It doesn't matter how, as long as you win. This might seem like an unfair criticism, because it's so extreme and portrays emotivists as highly cynical concerning the whole moral enterprise, but here's a notorious quote from Stevenson which lends plausibility to this criticism: 'Any statement about any fact which any speaker considers likely to alter attitudes may be adduced as a reason for or against an ethical judgment' (Ethics and Language, p. 114).

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